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2ABSTRACT 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America without warning, killing 
2752 in New York City alone. The President declared war on terrorism and 
pledged to use all resources at United States’ disposal to conquer the enemy.  
On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA PATRIOT 
ACT, giving the law enforcement officials expansive powers and security 
agencies increased resources to fight terrorism, at home and abroad.  
 
A cursory review of the legal literature shows that the USA PATRIOT ACT 
was “rushed” passed Congress by the Bush administration without following 
the usual legislative procedure. Throughout the entire legislative process, 
neither the Congress nor the Administration has systematically investigated 
and critically debated the merit – necessity and efficacy, costs and benefits, 
and the impact and implications of the ACT on the Constitution, on the 
society, on the people.  More mystifyingly, neither the general public nor the 
mass media took the government to task for a want of due diligent in 
scrutinizing the ACT.  How could this have happened?  To date, no serious 
attempt has been made to explain how and why the USA PATRIOT ACT 
was adopted without any serious context and effective challenge. This is a 
first attempt to do so. 
 
This article, based on a larger research project (“The Impact and 
Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on American Society.”) investigated 
into the legislative history of the USA PATRIOT ACT, broadly define.  This 
article is first of a two part series reporting upon: “The Making of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT”.  It is subtitled: “Legislative Process and Dynamics”.  The 
article to follow is subtitled: “Legislative Climate and Political Context.”  
 
This article examined the Congressional records, tracked the floor debates 
and monitored newspaper accounts to document the process and detail the 
dynamics as to how the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed.  The subsequent 
article would be looking into the historical context, political climate, social 
circumstances, and cultural milieu to ascertain why the USA PATRIOT 
ACT was made in the way and manner it did. 
 
3The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT I: 
The Legislative Process and Dynamics 
"Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
temporary safety deserves neither liberty nor safety." 
 
Benjamin Franklin 
I
Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked America without warning, killing 
2752 in New York City alone.2 On September 12, 2001, the President 
declared war on terrorism, pledging: “United States of America will use all 
our sources to conquer this enemy.”3 On October 26, 2001, President Bush 
signed into law the USA PATRIOT ACT,4 giving the law enforcement 
officials expansive powers and the security agencies increased resources to 
fight terrorism, at home and abroad.5
A cursory review of the legal literature6 shows that the USA PATRIOT Act 
was “rushed” passed Congress by the Bush administration without following 
 
2 There are conflicting accounts on the number of death toll to 9/11.  The figure cited here 
is based on the most recent accounting of confirmed dead. See “2,752: World Trade 
Center Death Toll Shrinks By 40,” WNBC.com October 30, 2003. The other account is 
2819 deaths, “9/11 by the Numbers”  New York Magazine 
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm Altogether, the FBI 
reported 3,047 victims resulting from the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001: 2,175 
males and 648 females died at the World Trade Center; 108 males and 71 females died at 
the Pentagon; and 20 males and 20 females died in the plane crash in Somerset County, 
PA. Seventy-one law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty at a result of the 
attacks on the World Trade Center.  (Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2002. Uniform 
Crime Reports: Crime in the United  States 2001. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of 
Justice.) 
3 “Remarks By The President In Photo Opportunity With The National Security Team,”  
The Cabinet Room, 10:53 A.M. EDT. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary , 
September 12, 2001. http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01091208.htm
4 USA PATRIOT Act, October 26, 2001, P. L.107-056; 115 STAT. 272. 
5 For legal analysis, see Charles Doyle, “The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis,” 
Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2002. 
6 A recent systematic biographic search by a law librarian uncovered only one entry 
having to do the legislative history of  USA PATRIOT ACT, i.e. Beryl A. Howell, 
“Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145
(2004).  Howell benefited from being an insider to the legislative process.  He worked for 
4the usual legislative procedure, i.e., agency review,7 public hearings,8 mark 
up, 9 floor debate,10 and conference report,11 in both chambers.12 More 
 
Senator Leahy, then the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  See Kate Dixon, 
“The U.S.A. PATRIOT Act: A Selected Bibliography,” Research Librarian Western New 
England College School of Law Library. April 2005. The author’s independent research 
by author showed that there was no authoritative account on the legislative history of 
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 and USA PATRIOT ACT.   The data relied upon for this 
research came from the following sources.   For a brief, but informative, account of how 
the Act was rushed through Congress, see the investigative report of Robert O' Harrow Jr.
(with assistance from the Center for Investigative Reporting) “Six Weeks in Autumn,” 
Washington Post. Sunday, October 27, 2002; Page W06 (The Patriot Act was rushed 
through Congress by the administration under the stewardship of Ashcroft.)  For a day to 
day account of anti-terrorism legislative activities in the Congress, see Tech Law Journal 
Daily E-Mail Alert http://www.techlawjournal.com/welcome.htm For a detail 
description of the passage of the Patriot Act, see James Bovard, Terrorism and Tyranny: 
Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003), esp. Chapter 4: “Patriot Railroad.”  For a compilation of legislative materials, see 
Bernard D., Jr. Reams and  Christopher Anglim (Editors), USA Patriot Act: A Legislative 
History of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act  (Fred B Rothman & Co, 2002). For a 
summary of the process, see “Introduction”, Id. For an inside the beltway account of the 
legislative process, see “USA PATRIOT Act: A Summary of ALA Activities,” ALA 
Washington Office, Jan.19, 2002.  For an electronic library of key legislative documents, 
consult “Legislative History of the USA PATRIOT Act,” Center for Democracy and 
Technology.  For critical events in the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT, see Steven 
Brill, “WHAT PRICE FREEDOM? The day the Constitution died,” Capitol Hill Blue 
March 3, 2003.  http://chblue.com/artman/publish/printer_1865.shtml
7 Morton H. Halperin, “Less Secure, Less Free , “ American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 20, 
Nov. 19, 2001.  http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/20/halperin-m.html (The 
Administration original anti-terrorism measures (CTA – ATA – MTA) was the 
handmaiden of the Attorney General (AG) staff, alone. The Office of Budget 
Management (OBM) was intentionally by passed to deny and avoid input and comments 
from agencies.) 
8 There were two hearings being held, one on September 25, 2001 when AG Ashcroft 
was invited to answer questions on Administration’s anti-terrorism proposals (MATA – 
ATA).  The Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on Tuesday, September 
25, 2001, at 10:00 a.m. on "Homeland Defense."  Presided by Chairman Leahy. The other 
was called by Senator Feingold who called a public hearing on October 3, 2001 to discuss 
the civil liberties implications of the PATRIOT ACT and related anti-terrorism measures. 
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism, and 
Property Rights held  a hearing titled "Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of 
Terrorism." Presided by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI)  
9 Morton H. Halperin, “The Liberties We Defend,” American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 18 
Oct. 22, 2001. http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/halperin-m-2.html (“Four key 
Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee wrote to their chairman questioning the 
5significantly, throughout the entire USA PATRIOT Act legislative process, 
neither the Congress nor the Administration has systematically investigated, 
judiciously examined, openly debated, and comprehensively considered the 
relative merits and utilities – necessity and efficacy, costs and benefits – and 
the impact and implication  – long and short, direct and indirect  - of the 
ACT on the Constitution,13 on the society, on the people.  In fact, it is fair to 
 
rush to mark up a bill (MATA) after only one hearing with the attorney general (9/25/01). 
"What we must avoid," they declared, "is the impulse to hastily approve wholesale 
changes to search and seizure, surveillance, immigration and other laws in an 
understandable but misguided attempt to thwart future attacks.") 
10 Floor debate was limited to 4 hours for USA ACT.  Congressional Record: October 11, 
2001 (Senate) Page S10547-S10630   The debate was less a debate as it was an 
opportunity to put things on the record, i.e. to detail the content and describe the process 
(Senator Leahy started by observing that the Bill was not to anyone’s liking); list the 
concessions and catalogue the (negotiated) achievements (Senate Leady spent most of the 
time allotted explaining various provisions); leave a legislative record anticipating 
Supreme Court challenges ahead (Senate Specter (R-PA).  See also Beryl A. Howell, 
“Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145
(2004). (From the beginning to the end, the anti-terrorism legislation was orchestrated for 
passage by the Administration, not open for debate by the public or subject to scrutiny of 
the Congress.  In the final USA ACT debate, the Senate leadership from both parties 
made it known that that the USA ACT was not to be changed.  No floor amendments 
were allowed, save for three by Senator Feingold.  Dissenters were shunned, lest they 
undo the hard fought and long struggled compromise.) 
11 Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). (House and Senate Conference on PATRIOT ACT and USA 
ACT was done away with because the Bush Administration in general and AG Ashcroft 
in particular was afraid that the conference leadership (as then constituted) might 
jeopardize the chance of passage.). 
12 For process in the Senate, see “Guide to Senate Legislative Processes” (Congressional 
Research Service, Feb. 2002). For process in the House, see HOW OUR LAWS ARE 
MADE, Revised and Updated by Charles W. Johnson, Parliamentarian, United States 
House of Representatives (Last update: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 18:49:22 GMT). 
13 There were some concerned expressed by some vocal member of the House and 
Senate, e.g. Leahy Feingold, and a coalition of interested parties, e.g. ACLU and EFF,  
over he dire  consequences of the ACT on civil liberties. But these voices were 
intentionally suppressed and conveniently ignored. As a result there was no serious 
debate over the long term impact and implications of the ACT on the Constitutional, e.g. 
how our democratic institutions and rule of law culture might changed in the wage of 
9/11, domestically and internationally. As it turned out from hindsight, 9/11 was a 
watershed event. The war on terror has changed international opinion about US 
democratic institutions and domestic attitude towards law and order. For intentional 
opinion, see “Global Opinion: The Spread of Anti-Americanism A review of Pew Global 
Attitudes Project findings,” January 24, 2005 (Increasingly the world – friends and foes 
6say, as other knowledgeable insiders have observed, that the USA PATRIOT 
ACT was entirely a Bush administration brainchild, conceived by the AG, 
imposed on the Congress14 and fed to the American people in a time of 
crisis15 and with the use of high handed tactics.16 How could that have 
happened? This is the research question this article seeks to address.  To 
date, no serious attempt has been made to understand how and why the USA 
PATRIOT ACT was able to rush through Congress without serious contest 
and effective challenge.17 This is a first attempt to do so. 
 
alike – from Europe to Asia, from South America to Africa - has a negative image of 
America, e.g. in terms of favorable ratings, Britain went from 75% (summer 2002) to 
58% (Mar. 2004) and Jordon went from 25% to 5% in the same period.  The sincerity of 
US war on terrorism was widely questioned in 2004: Britain (41%), France (61%), 
Russia (48%), Germany (65%), Turkey (64%), Morocco (66%), Jordon (58%) and 
Pakistan (58%).  Most significantly, world public opinion about US’s commitment to 
democracy has slipped in 2004 survey: Britain (45% less committed), France (79%), 
Russia (53%), Germany (70%), Turkey (73%), Morocco (66%), Jordon (56%) and 
Pakistan (57%).  For domestic opinion "Americans on Terrorism: Two Years After 9/11," 
Program on International Policy Attitudes and Knowledge Networks (2003) (By a margin 
of 52% vs. 38%, US public surveyed observed that remove of (Constitutional) limitations 
on government has gone too far.(p.9) Contrary to government policy. A major believed 
that US citizens detained as terrorists should be given rights (80%) and afforded lawyers 
(78%).  
14 Morton H. Halperin, "Less Secure, Less Free," The American Prospect vol. 12 no. 20, 
November 19, 2001 (Even the AG did not read the ATA.) and Beryl A. Howell, “Seven 
Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). 
15 The Bush Administration has rejected this charge, emphatically.  Viet Dinh “A White 
Paper: How Does the USA Patriot Act defends democracy.”  The Foundation for the 
Defense of Democracies, June 1, 2004.  (During the drafting of the anti-terrorism 
measures, the Administration has listened to and took heed from a coalition of concerned 
voices. (p. 3) http://www.defenddemocracy.org/usr_doc/USA_Patriot_Act.pdf
16 Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004). (AG Ashcroft repeatedly demanded passage of 
Administration proposals with no debate and revisions, with the threat of political fallout 
of yet another terrorism as the political weapon of choice.) See Author, “The Making of 
USA PATRIOT ACT: “Legislative Climate and Political Forces.” (On file with author).  
17 The two exceptions being Beryl A. Howell, “Seven Weeks: The Making of the USA 
PATRIOT Act,” 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1145 (2004).  (Howell benefited from being an 
insider to the legislative process.  He worked for Senator Leahy, then the Chairman of 
Senate Judiciary Committee) and Robert O' Harrow Jr. (with assistance from the Center 
for Investigative Reporting) “Six Weeks in Autumn,” Washington Post. Sunday, October 
27, 2002; Page W06 (The USA PATRIOT ACT was rushed through Congress by the 
administration under the stewardship of AG staff.)  There was suggestion that the 
President was personally involved by giving the matching order, i.e. AG Ashcroft acted 
only as a loyal foot soldier.)    
7This article, based on a larger research project,18 investigated into the 
legislative history of the USA PATRIOT ACT, broadly define.  This article 
is a first of two part series reporting upon: “The Making of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT”. It is subtitled: “Legislative Process and Dynamics”.  The 
article to follow is subtitled: “Legislative Climate and Political Context.”19 
This article examined the Congressional records, tracked the floor debates 
and examined newspaper records to understand the process and document 
the dynamics as to how the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed.  The 
subsequent article would be looking into the historical context, political 
climate, social circumstances, and cultural milieu to ascertain why the USA 
PATRIOT ACT was made in the way and manner it did. 
 
This article is organized into the following parts. After this “Introduction,” Part II: “The 
Legislative Process” traced the origin and followed the development of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT. It observed that the ACT was rushed through the Congress with few 
consultations with the public, collectively, and virtually no participation by the 
legislators, individually.  Part III: “A failure of process” investigated into how the 
legislative process had failed?  It further observed that such a failure of process set the 
stage for and resulted in post legislative challenges to the USA PATRIOT ACT.  Part IV: 
“A Preliminary Assessment” descried and discussed some of concerns raised and issued 
posed about the USA PATRIOT ACT. Part V: “Concluding observations” summarized 
the article’s major findings as it discussed some of the reasons why the legislative process 
was compromised, a subject matter to be dealt with at length and in more detail in the 
second part to: “The Making of USA PATRIOT ACT.” 
18 The article is the result of a three years research project (2002 – 2005) entitled “The 
Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on American Society.”  Research output 
to-date include: “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act: A Preliminary 
Analysis” (Midwest Criminal Justice Association Annual Conference, October 2-4, 
2004); “USA PATRIOT Act: Just the Facts” (“Patriot Act Forum,” League of Women 
Voters, Oshkosh, WI, Nov. 18, 2003); “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT 
Act on American libraries” (Asian Association of Police Studies IV Annual Conference, 
Dec. 15-18, 2003) and  “The Impact and Implications of USA PATRIOT Act on 
American Higher Education” (Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences Annual 
Conference, March 9-13, 2004). “The USA PATRIOT ACT: Some Unanswered 
Questions,” Wisconsin Political Scientist Vol. IX (3), Fall 2003, pp. 6-9; “USA 
PATRIOT ACT: More Questions than Answers” (2005) and “Implementing the USA 
PATRIOT ACT: A Case Study of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS)” (2005), both currently under publication review. 
19 Author, “The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT II: “Legislative Climate and 
Political Context.” (October 1, 2005). Under review. On file with author. 
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The Legislative Process 
 
Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 - AMENDMENT NO. 156220 
The first comprehensive and significant post 9/11 anti-terrorism 
measure21 introduced was in the form of an amendment attached to a budget 
appropriation bill “DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND 
STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED AGENCIES 
APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2002” (HR 2500) in the Senate on September 
 
20 Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, S. Amdt. 1562, 107th Cong. (2001), 
http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap2.shtml. (last visited November 16, 
2003). 
21 For a list of 9/11 legislations, see “LEGISLATION RELATED TO THE ATTACK OF 
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001,” http://thomas.loc.gov/home/terrorleg.htm The Acts and Bills 
introduced during the two week of 9/11 included: Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 
2001, Public Law No: 107-134 (introduced 9/13/2001) (“Exempts from income taxes any 
individual who dies as a result of wounds or injury incurred from the terrorist attacks 
against the United States on April 19, 1995, or September 11, 2001, or who dies as a 
result of illness incurred from a terrorist attack involving anthrax occurring on or after 
September 11, 2001, and before January 1, 2002 (such attacks).”); Public Safety Officer 
Benefits Bill, Public Law No: 107-37 (introduced 9/13/2001) (“To provide for the 
expedited payment of certain benefits for a public safety officer who was killed or 
suffered a catastrophic injury as a direct and proximate result of a personal injury 
sustained in the line of duty in connection with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.”); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (“To authorize 
appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of 
the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central 
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.”); 2001 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to 
Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Public Law No: 107-38 (introduced 9/14/2001) 
(“Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 2001 for additional 
disaster assistance, for anti-terrorism initiatives, and for assistance in the recovery from 
the tragedy that occurred on September 11, 2001, and for other purposes.”); Air 
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Public Law No: 107-42 (introduced 
on 9/21/2001) (“To preserve the continued viability of the United States air transportation 
system.”); Freedom Bonds Act of 2001, H.R.2899 (introduced 9/17/2001) (“To authorize 
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue Freedom Bonds in response to the September 11, 
2001, hijackings and attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, and for other 
purposes.”). For a summary of existing terrorism federal law provisions as of October 
2001, see “Terrorism Legislation Comparison,” 
http://www.netcaucus.org/books/surveillance2001/docs/EFF_Leg_Compare_Chart.pdf
913, 2001,22 i.e. AMENDMENT NO. 1562, entitled: “Combating Terrorism 
Act of 2001." (CTA) 23 
The professed purpose CTA was: “To enhance the capability of the United 
States to deter, prevent, and thwart domestic and international acts of 
terrorism against United States nationals and interests.”24 In more layman’s 
term and as Senator Hatch put it: “It is essential that we give our law 
enforcement authorities every possible tool to search out and bring to justice 
those individuals who have brought such indiscriminate death into our 
backyard.”25 
The CTA was cosponsored by Senators Hatch (R-Utah), Feinstein (D-CA), 
and Kyl (R-Arizona). Senators Dewine, Session, Thompson, Thurmond, 
McCain, and Schumer also joined.26 The CTA passed the Senate two days 
after 9/11, with about 30 minutes of floor debate and one lone dissenting 
voice, i.e. that of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT). Leahy wanted more time to 
study the bill.27 This was an all too familiar pattern with post 9/11 legislative 
measures,28 to be repeated with the USA PATRIOT ACT.29 
22 See Congressional Record, September 13, 2001, at pages S9401-4. 
23 For a discussion, see “Liberty for Security,” Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0036 (2001), esp. 
“Combating Terrorism Act of 2001.” For a copy of the CTA  text, see  
http://msbnetworks.net/~hillct/cta/ For Senate floor debate, see “Senate debate on wiretap 
and anti-terrorism proposals,” Sept. 13, 2001 (Hereinafter “Combating Terrorism Act of 
2001 debate”) http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap.shtml
24 See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. 
25 Declan McCullagh, “Senate OKs FBI Net Spying,” WIRED NEWS 12:55 PM Sep. 14, 
2001 PT http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46852,00.html
26 Senator Kyl, Hatch, and Feinstein were all members of the Subcommittee on 
Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information and Terrorism, (106th Congress), 
and later the Technology and Homeland Security (107th and 108th Congress) which was 
responsible for “Oversight of anti-terrorism enforcement and policy”.  Senator Feinstein 
was the Chairman of Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information (106th Congress) in 2001 with Senator Kye acting as the Ranking 
Republican. Senator Kyl was the Chairman and Senator Feinstein was the Ranking 
Democrat on the Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security (107th and 108th 
Congress). 
27 See Senate Leahy floor speech, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. 
28 See Author, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Some Unanswered Questions” (September 1, 
2005) (Under review, on file with author), esp. “Table 2: The number of 9/11 legislative 
actions acted upon within six (6) months,” referencing Margaret F. Klemm & Albert C. 
Ringelstein, “Congressional Response to the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks,” 
extensions. A Journal of Carl Albert Center (Fall 2002). 
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The CTA was intended to provide law enforcement officials with the 
necessary resources and added legal authority to fight terrorism, particularly 
in the investigation of 9/11 terrorists and to bring them to justice. As 
observed by Senator Hatch in introducing the CTA: “we, as lawmakers, 
must take every step possible to ensure, in addition to adequate financial 
resources, that the law enforcement community has the proper investigative 
tools at its disposal to track down the participants in this evil conspiracy and 
to bring them to justice.” 30 
Facing with a national crisis of yet untold proportion, the Congressional 
leadership had contingency plans to secure the nation, in the event CTA 
failed to materialize, there were to be back up plans.  For example, on 
September 20, 2001, Rep. Lamar Smith circulated a bill - Public Safety and 
Cyber Security Enhancement Act (PSCSEA) – similar to the CTA as a 
backup for S.A. 1562 should H.R. 2500 failed to pass.  Sen. Patrick Leahy 
was also working on his own anti-terrorism bill, later passed as the USA 
ACT.  
 
The CTA was demanded by the public (to secure the nation)31 and required 
by the situation (in fighting an illusive enemy). 32 Above all else it reflected 
and reinforced the nation’s sober mood and crisis mentality. The political 
climate of the time was in seeking security at all costs.33 Most of the 
provisions have been recommended by former anti-terrorism commissions, 
e.g. National Commission on Terrorism34 and requested by law enforcement 
 
29 Id. 
30 See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. 
31 Senator Kye: “But, as policymakers, we have also been asked some hard questions by 
our constituents and those questions include things such as: Why can't our Government 
do something about these horrible crimes?” Id. 
32 “On the Importance of Anti-terrorism Legislation,” (“Viet Dinh: I think the American 
people have made their preferences very clear in their public statements expressed to the 
various news agencies, not only with respect to the fight against terrorism, but on this 
package in particular.”) http://www.aclj.org/news/nf_011004_viet_dinh_interview.asp
33 Author, “The making of the USA PATRIOT ACT II: The Legislative Climate and 
Political Context,” (October 1, 2005). Under review. On file with author. 
33 Combating Terrorism Act of 2001, S. Amdt. 1562, 107th Cong. (2001). 
34 See testimony of Senator Kyle, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. (“We 
implement one of the recommendations of the Bremer commission, which said there is a 
lot of illicit fundraising for terrorist organizations going on in the United States. “) 
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officials for years. As Senator Kye observed when speaking in support of the 
bill: “In addition to that, we have had a lot of testimony from the Director of 
the FBI and other U.S. Government officials all imploring us to do some 
things to help in this battle against terrorism.” 35 Nearly half of the 
provisions have passed the Senate one and half year before.36 
The “Combating Terrorism Act of 2001'' provided for improvement on: 
 
(a) Readiness and readiness The Comptroller General was asked to report 
upon the capacity and readiness of National Guard in the event of a terrorist 
attack. Particularly, “an assessment of the capabilities of the National Guard 
to preemptively disrupt a terrorist attack within the United States involving 
weapons of mass destruction, and to respond to such an attack” (Section 812 
(a).37 
(b) Scientific and technology research The President was asked to establish a 
long-term and comprehensive scientific and technology research program to 
prevent, preempt, detect, interdict, and respond to catastrophic terrorist 
attacks (Section 813). 38 
(c) Legal authority The Attorney General was asked to conduct a review of 
the legal authority of the Federal government agencies to adequately respond 
to - prevent, preempt, detect, and interdict – “catastrophic terrorist attacks.” 
(Section 814)39 
(d) Intelligence recruitment The Director of Central Intelligence was asked 
to rescind the 1995 CIA guidelines relating to “the recruitment of persons 
 
Bremer and Sonnenberg, “Countering the Changing Threat on International Terrorism,” 
National Commission on Terrorism. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html
35 Id. 
36 See testimony of Senator Kyle, Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. (“In fact, we 
incorporated some of the provisions of these commission recommendations in the bill 
that passed the Senate a year and a half ago.”) 
37 SEC. 812. ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL GUARD CAPABILITIES TO 
PREEMPTIVE. 
38 SEC. 813. LONG-TERM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT TO ADDRESS 
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS. 
39 SEC. 814. REVIEW OF AUTHORITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES TO ADDRESS 
CATASTROPHIC TERRORIST ATTACKS. 
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who have access to intelligence related terrorist plans, intentions and 
capabilities.” (Section 815)40 
(e) Wiretapping The President was asked to report on “legal authorities that 
govern the sharing of criminal wiretap information under applicable Federal 
laws, including section 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
403-4). (Section 816 (a).41 
(f) Terrorism financing The Federal Government was asked to use all the 
tools available to prevent, deter, or disrupt the fundraising activities of 
international terrorist organizations, and it should do so. (Section 817 (b)42 
(g) Controls of biological pathogens The Attorney General was asked to 
report upon on “the means of improving United States controls of biological 
pathogens and the equipment necessary to develop, produce, or deliver 
biological weapons” (Section 818 (a).43 Specifically, The Attorney General 
was asked to report upon measures to protect possession, handling, storing, 
or transporting of such pathogens from illegal theft or other wrongful 
diversion (Section 818 (b). 
 
(i) Employee liability insurance The Head of Federal agencies were to 
reimburse law enforcement agents and intelligence employees for 
professional liability insurance when conducting counterterrorism duties 
(Section 819 (a)44 
(j) Use a pen register or trap and trace device Federal and State investigative 
or law enforcement officers are authorized to use a pen register or trap and 
trace device to obtain “dialing, routing, addressing” information by 
certifying “to the court that the information likely to be obtained by such 
installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”  
 
40 SEC. 815. GUIDELINES ON RECRUITMENT OF TERRORIST INFORMANTS 
41 SEC. 816. DISCLOSURE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF CERTAIN 
INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED BY INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS. 
42 SEC. 817. JOINT TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FUNDR 
43 SEC. 818. IMPROVEMENT OF CONTROLS ON PATHOGENS AND EQUIPMENT 
FOR PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
44 SEC. 819. REIMBURSEMENT OF PERSONNEL PERFORMING 
COUNTERTERRORISM DUTIES FOR PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE 
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(Section.832 (b).45 It also authorized the emergency installation of such 
devices by U.S. Attorneys if there is immediate threat to “national security”, 
public health or safety”, “attack on the integrity or availability of a protected 
computer (Section.832 (c) 
 
(k) Intercept wire, oral and electronic communications Law enforcement 
officials can intercept wire, oral and electronic communications in the 
investigation of terrorism (Section 833)46 and computer fraud and abuse 
(Section 834) offenses.47 
As it turned out, the process and debate over AMENDMENT NO. 1562 
served as a dry run for the USA PATRIOT ACT; acting as harbinger of 
things to come. Specifically, it anticipated many of the substantive issues 
raised, e.g. roving wiretap as threatening civil liberties, and rehearsed most 
of process related arguments made, e.g. Congress should not rush to 
judgment without proper notice and public hearing.  For example, much like 
the USA PATRIOT Act the CTA was supplied to the Senators only 30 
minutes before the floor debate.48 In this regard, Senator Leahy CTA floor 
speech was instructive on things to come:  
 
“Unfortunately, because this is something that we have had no 
hearings on, we haven't had the discussions in the appropriate 
committees--Intelligence, Armed Services, and Judiciary--we 
are somewhat limited in opposition…  I would feel far more 
comfortable voting on something like this if these various 
committees not only had a chance to look at it but that President 
Bush's administration--the Attorney General, the Director of 
CIA, the Secretary of Defense--would have the opportunity to 
let us know their views on it. I would feel far more comfortable 
with that.”49 
45 SEC. 832. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN 
REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES. 
46 SEC. 833. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM OFFENSES. 
47 SEC. 834. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE. 
48 Morgan Streetman, “Liberty for Security,” 2001 The Duke Law & Technology Review 
(DLTR) 0036, para. 8  http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0036.html
49 See Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 debate. 
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The CTA did not attract much immediate media report or public attention.50 
The nation was still taken back over the aftermath and dealing with the 
consequences of the 9/11 attack.   
 
There were however serious concerns and vocal complaints over the 
vagueness of many of its provisions, e.g. the exact meaning of “addressing” 
and “routing” data accessible by pen register and track and trace order,51 and 
their erosive impact on liberties, e.g. how intrusive is electronic surveillance 
on web based activities,52 form some quarters, mainly from long established 
interest (human rights) groups, such as ACLU, and (civil rights) advocacy 
 
50 There were occasional constituent letters to the law-makers.  There was not systematic 
counting or analysis of such letters. See letter of Mike Perry (505 E. White St #4, 
Champaign, Il, 61820)to Dear Senators Durbin and Fitzgerald, and Representative 
Johnson (A-G Ashcroft's Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA); Sen. Leahy's Uniting and 
Strengthening of America Act (USAA); Rep. Smith's Public Safety and Cyber Security 
Enhancement Act (PSCSEA, H.R. 2915); Sen. Hatch's Combating Terrorism Act (CTA, 
amendment S.A. 1562 to bill H.R.  2500); and Sen. Graham's Intelligence to Prevent 
Terrorism Act (IPTA, S.  1448), and Sen. Gregg's draft anti-encryption legislation were 
ill advised. Instead of catching hard core terrorists, they would affect innocent citizens.  
For example by declaring computer crime terrorism acts, it end up serving extensive 
punishments for “young, curious programmers, essentially pranksters” who one day 
might “grow up to be accomplished security professionals.”)  
http://fscked.org/rants/letters/Repletter
51“Senate OKs FBI Net Spying,” Wired, September 11, 2001 ("Nobody really knows 
what routing and addressing information is.... If you're putting in addressing information 
and routing information, you may not just get (From: lines of e-mail messages), you 
might also get content," the source said. )  
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,46852,00.html
52 See open web e-mail to Senator Feinstein “14-09-2001: Combating Terrorism Act of 
2001,” http://www.kocharhook.com/nick/letters/cta2001.html
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coalitions, such as Electronic Frontier Foundation.53 For example, the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation was critical of various aspects of CTA: 54 
(1) CTA expands “traditional” wiretap authority beyond recognition. Before 
CTA, wiretap orders were authorized based on a short list of well defined 
predicated offences. Now, the CTA allows for wiretapping based on loosely 
copulated terrorism crime (Section 833)55 and computer fraud and abuse 
(Section 834).56 
(2) CTA allows for application of “pen register” and “track and trace” to 
electronic communication, e.g. e-mail, web surf, URL search. This opens up 
the possibility of tracking content. 
 
The CTA expands the pen register concept from merely capturing phone 
numbers57 to capturing routing and addressing information in any electronic 
communications, e.g. Internet communications. Thus the definition of pen 
register under the amended (18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) now reads: "a device or 
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling 
information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or 
electronic communication is transmitted ..."  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) 
defines ''trap and trace device'' means a device or process which captures the 
 
53 The Electronic Frontier helps keep track of impact of anti-terrorism measures (not all 
of them related to terrorism law or USA PATRIOT ACT) from day one:  “Chilling 
Effects of Anti-Terrorism "National Security" Toll on Freedom of Expression, including:  
Websites Shut Down by US Government;  Websites Shut Down by Other Governments;  
Websites Shut Down by Internet Service Provider;  Websites Shut Down or Partially 
Removed by Website Owner; US Government Websites That Shut Down or Removed 
Information; US Government Requests to Remove Information  
Media Professionals Terminated or Suspended; Other Employees Terminated or 
Suspended; Related Incidents. 
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/antiterrorism_chill.php#websiteshutdo
wnusgov
54 EFF Analysis of SA 1562, Subtitle B (Sept. 19, 2001), http://www.eff.org/ (last visited 
October 2, 2001). 
55 SEC. 833. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM OFFENSES. 
56 SEC. 834. AUTHORITY TO INTERCEPT WIRE, ORAL, AND ELECTRONIC 
COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE. 
57 Under the former law “pen register” and “track and trace” devices only applied to 
"wire" communications. Thus, a “pen register” is "a device which records or decodes 
electronic or other impulses which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted 
on the telephone line to which such device is attached ..."  
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incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number 
or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably 
likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, provided, 
however, that such information shall not include the contents of any 
communication..” 
 
(3) CTA allows for multi-jurisdiction “pen register” and “trap and trace” 
orders.  Whereas before CTA pen register and trap and trace orders only 
apply "within the jurisdiction of the court." The CTA allows for one stop 
“pen register” and “trap and trace” orders that are applicable nation wide, 
without the legal jurisdiction and beyond the effective supervision of the 
authoring judge: "The order shall, upon service of the order, apply to any 
entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the United 
States whose assistance is required to effectuate the order." (Section 832 (b) 
(1). 
 
(4) CTA lowers the threshold of approval (i.e. relevant to ongoing criminal 
investigation) and minimizes judicial supervision (i.e. court order based on 
certification of law enforcement officials) in the application for “pen 
register” and “trap and trace” orders in electronic surveillance cases.  In so 
doing, CTA extends the old wiretap order application standard and 
procedures to electronic searches.58 Section 832 (b) (1) reads in pertinent 
part: “Upon an application made under section 3122(a)(1) of this title, the 
court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a 
pen register or trap and trace device if the court finds that the attorney for the 
Government has certified to the court that the information likely to be 
obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.” (Emphasis supplied) 
 
There were also concerns with the legislative process: 
 
“Perhaps extending the privileges of government to limit our 
privacy is something that should be done in half an hour in the 
middle of the night, as it was here, but then again, maybe 
 
58 18 U.S.C. 3223 provides in pertinent parts "the court shall enter an ex parte order 
authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device within the 
jurisdiction of the court if the court finds that the attorney for the Government or the State 
law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that the information 
likely to be obtained by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal 
investigation." 
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Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Patrick Leahy of Vermont 
were correct, that this was all being done far too quickly, with a 
speed in fact that prevented most of the senators to make a full 
review of the legislation which was presented to them a mere 
half hour before they were to vote on it.”59 
Some felt that the CTA were more show than substance,60 symbolic than 
real.61 
The Bush administration in general, and AG Ashcroft in particular, has been 
consistently blamed and universally condemned by many in the United 
States for using 9/11 to push for draconian measures, transforming United 
States into an Owellian state with the passage of CTA – MATA - ATA – 
Patriot Act.62 As lamented by Al Gore: "They have taken us much farther 
down the road toward an intrusive, 'big brother'-style government - toward 
the dangers prophesied by George Orwell in his book '1984' - than anyone 
ever thought would be possible in the United States of America."63 
While it certainly is true that Ashcroft was responsible with originating and 
implementing many of the post 9/11 terrorism counter-measures, he did not 
drafted all of them out of clean cloth.  A fair reading of historical records 
suggests that many of the counter-measures already existed on the book and 
 
59 “Combating Terrorism Act of 2001 - Analyzed (Op-Ed),”Tue Sep 18th, 2001 at 
12:24:17 PM EST http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2001/9/17/22230/2697
60 Bon Barr the maverick Republican Representative openly questioned the necessity and 
utility of the CTA.  “Fighting Terrorism, Preserving Civil Liberties,” CATO, POLICY 
FORUM, Tuesday, October 2, 200. 4:00 p.m. (Featuring Rep. Bob Barr (R - Ga.), with 
commentary by Solveig Singleton, Senior Analyst, Competitive Enterprise Institute; 
Stuart Taylor, Senior Writer, National Journal; Jonathan Turley, Professor of Law, 
George Washington University.) 
61 “SECRECY NEWS: from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy,” 
September 14, 2001 (Most of legislation consisted of declaration of sense of Congress 
and requests for reports, rather than providing for new powers to fight terrorism.  The 
exception being doing away with 1995 CIA guidelines governing the recruitment of 
informants who have committed human rights violations.)  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/09/091401.html
62 “Gore: Bush Has Failed to Make U.S. Safer,” Earthlink, November 10, 2003. 
63 Id. 
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otherwise they were introduced by the Congress, as with making “pen 
register” and “track and trace” applicable electronically and nationally.64 
The MATA & ATA 
The conceptualization of what eventually comes to be known as the 
USA PATRIOT ACT started with a simple instruction from President Bush 
65 to the Attorney General (AG) Ashcroft immediately after the 9/11 attack: 
“John, make sure this (9/11 – terrorism) can’t happen again.”66 The AG 
took the charge seriously, and zealously, and above all else personally.67 68 
64 See “An Analysis of How the Events of September 11 May Change Federal Law,” 
Tech Law Journal, September 17, 2001 
65 To date, there is no investigation into the role of President Bush in the drafting and 
passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT and related anti-terrorist, measures.   Was President 
Bush a hands-off manager, aloof and detached, as many observers made him out to be? 
To what extent and in what manner did Bush contributed – in content and process -  to 
the passage of the USA PATRIOT ACT?  9/11 was a defining moment to the Bush 
administration.  How Bush handled 9/11, from talking to the crowd at ground zero to 
pushing the USA PATRIOT ACT through Congress, unmistakably reflected Bush 
governance philosophy and management style.  These are some of the traits attributed to 
Bush: ideological, elitists, not curious, not intellectual, focused, single minded, stubborn. 
commanding not consulting. not given to compromise,  contempt for Congress,  
dismissive of the media.    
66 The instruction was given in the White House in the afternoon of 9/11.  Steven Brill, 
After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon & Shuster, 2003), 
p. 15.  
67 Attorney General Ashcroft Announces the Formation of Anti-terrorism Task Forces in 
U.S. Attorney Offices, DOJ, Press release, September 18, 2001;  Letter to Mayors from 
Attorney General Ashcroft (9/19/01) (on formation of anti-terrorism task force) 
(September 19, 2001); ATTORNEY GENERAL ASHCROFT DIRECTS LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO IMPLEMENT NEW ANTI-TERRORISM ACT, 
DOJ, Press release, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2001; Dan Eggen, “Ashcroft champions 
Patriot Act Responding to critics, attorney general says law is linchpin of war on 
terrorism,” San Francisco Chronicle, Wednesday, August 20, 2003 (The AG took 
personally charge of  a national campaign (18 cities) to drum up support form the USA 
PATRIOT ACT).  For an assessment of Ashcroft’s tenure as AG and his impact on war 
on terrorism, see “CONTROVERSIAL TENURE” PBS- Online News-hour November 
11, 2004. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec04/ashcroft_11-11.html
68 In public service, officials are supposed to separate private preferences from public 
goods.  Public policy choices are determined by how such choices reflect public values 
and promote public interests, not personal ones.  In the case of Ashcroft, he not only 
failed to draw the distinction but actively make his own ideology, value and interests 
stands for the good of the nation; from religious believes, to moral values to political 
ideology.  JUDY BACHRACH, “John Ashcroft's Patriot Games,” Vanity Fair Feb. 1, 
2004. http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Ashcroft-Patriot-Games1feb04.htm
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The AG turned to Viet Dinh,69 an Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
Department of Justice,70 Office of Legal Policy, to work on an anti-terrorism 
package on the same day.71 On Thursday (September 13, 2001) Dinh told 
Ashcroft that the package – Mobilization Anti-Terrorism Act (MATA)72 - 
 
(“"There are only two things you find in the middle of the road, a moderate and a dead 
skunk" He believes that "you can legislate morality," and that any senator who suggests 
otherwise will simply be legislating "immorality, and we've done too much of that 
already." The attorney general invested his fight for the Patriot Act with a Crusader's 
fervor, "questioning his opponents' patriotism…") 
69 Viet Dinh was know as the “chief architect of the USA Patriot Act. "At Home in War 
on Terror: Viet Dinh has gone from academe to play a key behind-the scenes role. 
Conservatives love him; others find his views constitutionally suspect." Los Angeles 
Times September 18, 2002. http://www.asianam.org/viet%20dinh.htm In time, he 
becomes the ACTS chief spokesman and defender.  His rational for the USA PATRIOT 
ACT is always couched in terms of security before freedom; one cannot enjoy the later 
without the guarantee of the former. Viet Dinh “A White Paper: How Does the USA 
Patriot Act defends democracy.”  The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, June 
1, 2004.   
70 OPIC: USA Patriot Act; INTERVIEW SUBJECT: Viet Dinh; FILM: THE COST OF 
FREEDOM - Civil Liberties, Security and the USA PATRIOT Act; INTERVIEWER: 
Alison Rostankowski/Chip Duncan; TRANSCRIPTS: Troy Avdek.  © 2004 The Duncan 
Group, Inc. http://www.duncanentertainment.com/interview_vietdinh.php (Viet Dinh 
Interview) 
71 Another account suggested that Dinh’s marching order came on September 12, 2001 
(Wednesday) indirectly by way of Adam Ciongoli, Ashcroft's counselor. Robert 
O'Harrow Jr., “Six Weeks in Autumn,” Washington Post Sunday, October 27, 2002; Page 
W06.   
72 The original draft of the anti-terrorism package worked on by Dinh and released to the 
Congress on September 19, 2001 was a 31 page document entitled MATA.  For the 
proposed text of the first draft of MATA, see  
 http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20010919_mata_bill_draft.html For a fair and 
balance analysis of original draft to MATA, see DOJ 
 http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/20010919_doj_mata_analysis.html
The second draft of the MATA, a 21 pages bill, rendered on September 19, 2001l – 12.30 
pm, is entitled ATA of 2001. For text of second draft of MATA a/k/a ATA, see 
http://www.cdt.org/security/010920bill_text.pdf
For DOJ analysis of second draft of MATA, i.e. ATA, see  
http://www.cdt.org/security/010919terror.pdf Draft 9/19 12:30 pm [ET] Since then 
MATA and ATA has been interchangeably used to refer to both drafts.  As late as 
September 24, 2001, the AG still referred to the second draft MATA, when people 
outside the administration have correctly identity it as ATA.  See “ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ASHCROFT OUTLINES MOBILIZATION AGAINST TERRORISM 
ACT,” USDOJ September 24, 2001. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/September/492ag.htm
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would be ready by Friday (September 14, 2001).73 Dinh was assisted by 
David Carp, a DOJ lawyer who helped drafted the Oklahoma City (1995) 
anti-terrorism measures, 74 with input for John Yoo75 who later co-authored a 
repot finding that Geneva Conventions do not apply to Taliban or Al Qaeda 
fighters as a matter of international law because Afghanistan was a "failed 
state".76 
In the course of business and little over six weeks a 20 – 30 pages of MATA 
– ATA turned into a document which was 131 pages in length with 1016 
different sections. 
 
According to Dinh his first order of business was to consult law enforcement 
agents and prosecutors all over the nation for their ideas on how best to fight 
terrorism, in the short term and over the long haul.77 The three criteria for 
 
73 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon & 
Shuster, 2003), p. 52. 
74 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon & 
Shuster, 2003), p. 53. 
75 It is of interest to note that two Asian-Americans were appointed to leadership position 
in leading the legal charge on war on terror, domestically (Dinh) and internationally 
(Yoo). Was this a case of co-incidence?  (Asian-Americas, especially in public law, are 
not in abundance inside and outside the Administration.) Was this a case of ideological 
compatibility, i.e. Asian Americans are more conservative minded when it comes to 
defense issues? (Dinh was a member of the Federalist Society.) Was this a case of 
strategic deployment, i.e. to make it appears that war on terror is not one of white vs. 
colored.  Was this a case of meritorious appointment, i.e. Asian Americans in general and 
Dinh and Yoo in particular were distinguished legal professionals of their own right. Both 
of them came from ranked law schools. Both of them ended up as law professors.   Was 
this a case of Bush (affirmative action) policy at work, e.g. Bush has a track record of 
appointing high profile government jobs to minorities – Powel and Rice at State and 
Gonzalez at Justice.  The investigation of the role played by Asian American in war on 
terror should be revealing of Bush’s administration management philosophy and style, in 
turn shed light on the USA PATRIOT ACT’s passage. 
76 "Application of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees" (Jan. 9. 2002) 
(with Robert J. Delahunty). See “THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION TORTURE MEMO 
SCANDAL,” http://texscience.org/reform/torture/
77 This consultation process (if substantiated) contradicted the common impression and 
repeated allegations that the Bush administration have no done enough to incorporate 
different ideas and opposing views in the drafting process. Alternative, the USA 
PATRIOT ACT was an ideological statement, not a consultative or consultation 
document. A question still remains, why was the ATA – MATA – USA PATRIOT ACT 
not distributed for comments through the proper channels, i.e. through OMB onto each 
and every related and affected agencies.  
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suggestions from the field were: operationally necessity, limited impact on 
civil liberties, and conformity with Constitutionality. All told, fifty of the 
legislative proposals were compiled and submitted, most of them have been 
proposed and considered before, in one form or another.78 In fact, many of 
the proposed provisions in the MATA of 2001 were in fact off the shelf 
items from the 1996 anti-terrorism legislation, including roving wiretaps, 
releasing of customers’ information from telephone and Internet companies, 
and seizing of personal property.79 Additional provisions of the proposed 
MATA included measures which:  made it possible for law enforcement 
officials to obtain e-mail message header information and gather web 
browsing patterns without a wiretap order; 80 dilute judicial supervision and 
control over roving wiretaps;81 permit law enforcement to share wiretap 
information with the Executive branch;82 reduce restrictions on Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allowing it to be used domestically;83 
allow grand jury evidence to be shared with the US intelligence 
community;84 permit the President to designate any "foreign-directed 
individual, group, or entity," including any United States citizen or 
organization as fitting for FISA surveillance;85 preventing people from 
exercising their first amendment rights in discussion terrorism related 
matters;86 establish a DNA database for every criminals and certain sex 
offenders unrelated to terrorism.87 
Meantime, the first attempt to organize different opposition interest groups 
into a viable political force started to take shape, and has since been a thorn 
 
78 This detracted from opponents’ argument that the USA PATRIOT ACT provisions 
needed to be thoroughly researched and critically examined.  See Viet Dinh Inerview. 
79 There was an inconsistency in positions offered by the opponents to the Act, i.e. the 
USA PATRIOT ACT contained new and invasive provisions vs. USA PATRIOT ACT 
contained old and contested provisions.  Jennifer Van Bergen, “The USA PATRIOT Act 
Was Planned Before 9/11,” Truthout.org, 20 May, 2002 (“Many people do not know that 
the USA PATRIOT Act was already written and ready to go long before September 
11th.”) http://www.truthout.org/docs_02/05.21B.jvb.usapa.911.htm
80 SEC. 103. MODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES RELATING TO USE OF PEN 
REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES (2) (A) and 3 (B). 
81 SEC. 106. MULTI-POINT WIRETAPS. 
82.SEC. 108. AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE. 
83 SEC. 157. PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE AUTHORITY. 
84 SEC. 154. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION SHARING. 
85 SEC. 156, DEFINITION.  
86 SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM 
87 SEC. 356. DNA IDENTIFICATION OF TERRORISTS 
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to the administration effort in ushering a garrison state.  The impetus and 
agenda for the organization effort was bested summed up by Net Hentoff, a 
longtime activities of civil rights causes and key members to the group: 
 
To save our liberties, we have to organize nationally—as was 
done effectively in the civil rights and antiwar campaigns of the 
1960s. There are already a large number of groups that can and 
should form an organizing and educational network to put ads 
in newspapers and on radio and television, set up teach-ins on 
campuses and in town meetings around the country, and plan a 
March on Washington on the order of the 1963 assembly 
addressed by Martin Luther King ("I Have a Dream").88 
On September 14, 2001 (Thursday), Halperin and ACLU called a meeting of 
interested parties and concerned groups at the ACLU white townhouse in 
D.C. to discuss strategy as to how to deal with anticipated legislative and 
administration clamp down on civil liberties in the name of national security.  
The meeting was precipitated by the rush of 9/11 legislations having the 
effect of eroding established Constitutional rights. The meeting was well 
attended by different interest groups. These groups came from across the 
political spectrum as representing different ideologies, interests and agenda; 
converging in opposing the government’s civil rights depriving anti-
terrorism drive.  For example, People for the American Way was formed in 
the 1981 to fight the insidious influence of the extreme right such as right-
wing televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jimmy 
Swaggart.  In joining the coalition, it was most concerned with 
compromising of civil rights and minorities rights. 89 Project on 
Government Accountability (George Mason University) formed to improve 
government policy and decision making by promoting open policy choice 
and informed decisions through cost-benefit analysis. In joining the 
coalition, it sought to promote government accountability through a more 
open process.90 The Free Congress Foundation are political and moral 
conservatives dedicated to preserving traditional American way of life, e.g. 
 
88 Nat Hentoff, “Getting Back Our Rights Don’t Brood and Despair. Organize!” Village 
Voce, December 7th, 2001 2:45 PM 
http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0150,hentoff,30634,6.html
89 “Statement of People for the American Way President G Ralph Neas.” September 20, 
2001. http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/pfaw_release.pdf
90 “Whistle Blowers are Modern Paul Reveres Against Terrorism,”   September 20, 2001 
http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/gap_release.pdf
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Judeo-Christian Western culture.  As such it is against expansion of Federal 
power at the expense of the state and encroachment of individual rights by 
the government.91 Finally, “The Competitive Enterprise Institute is a non-
profit public policy organization dedicated to advancing the principles of 
free enterprise and limited government.” In joining the coalition, it sought to 
reduce government regulation of business and restriction of free market in 
the name or as a result of war on terrorism.92 
The coalition decided to issue a 10 points public statement calling for more 
rational debate: 
 
IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM93 
1. On September 11, 2001 thousands of people lost their lives in a 
brutal assault on the American people and the American form 
of government. We mourn the loss of these innocent lives and 
insist that those who perpetrated these acts be held accountable. 
2. This tragedy requires all Americans to examine carefully the 
steps our country may now take to reduce the risk of future 
terrorist attacks. 
3. We need to consider proposals calmly and deliberately with a 
determination not to erode the liberties and freedoms that are at 
the core of the American way of life. 
4. We need to ensure that actions by our government uphold the 
principles of a democratic society, accountable government and 
international law, and that all decisions are taken in a manner 
consistent with the Constitution. 
5. We can, as we have in the past, in times of war and of peace, 
reconcile the requirements of security with the demands of 
liberty. 
6. We should resist the temptation to enact proposals in the 
mistaken belief that anything that may be called anti-terrorist 
will necessarily provide greater security. 
7. We should resist efforts to target people because of their race, 
religion, ethnic background or appearance, including 
immigrants in general, Arab Americans and Muslims. 
 
91 .  “Free Congress: Established Online Petition” September 20, 
2001http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/statements/freecongress_release.pdf
92 http://www.cei.org/pages/about.cfm
93 The statements in text is a verbatim account from http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/
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8. We affirm the right of peaceful dissent, protected by the First 
Amendment, now, when it is most at risk. 
9. We should applaud our political leaders in the days ahead who 
have the courage to say that our freedoms should not be limited. 
10. We must have faith in our democratic system and our 
Constitution, and in our ability to protect at the same time both 
the freedom and the security of all Americans.  
 
The “In Defense of Freedom statement” was endorsed by more than 
150 organizations, 94 300 law professors, and 40 computer scientists.95 
On a Sunday, September 16, 2001, AG John Ashcroft made public his 
intention to ask Congress to write tougher anti-terrorist laws and authorized 
more powers to fight terrorism.  Subsequently on Monday, September 17, 
2001, Ashcroft discussed the details of anti-terrorist package he intended to 
send to the Congress:  
 
“Yesterday I met with several members of the House and 
Senate leadership, including the leadership of the Intelligence 
and Judiciary Committees. FBI Director Mueller and I 
discussed with them the current threat assessment, including 
our believe that associates of the hijackers that have ties to 
terrorist organizations may be a continuing presence in the 
United States. This threat assessment has helped us to identify 
several areas where we should strengthen our laws to increase 
the ability of the Department of Justice and its component 
agencies to identify, prevent and punish terrorism ...In the next 
few days, we intend to finalize a package of legislative 
measures that will be comprehensive. Areas covered include 
 
94 Other groups included NAACP Board of Directors; National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers; National Council of Churches of Christ, National Council of La Raza, 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, National Lawyers Guild, National Native 
American Bar Association, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Physicians for 
Human Rights, Rutherford Institute; the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee; 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; Amnesty International 
USA; Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs; Center for Constitutional Rights; Free 
Congress Foundation; Gun Owners of America; Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.  
95 http://www.indefenseoffreedom.org/
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criminal justice, immigration, intelligence gathering and 
financial infrastructure...”96 
The proposed anti-terrorists legislation promised to substantially enhance 
intelligence gathering capacity of law enforcement officials, including: 
 
First, allowing wiretapping of person, instead on just phone number:  
 
“And given the nature and availability of literally disposable 
telephones in modern society, we need to be able to have the 
court authority to monitor, not the phone, but the telephone 
communications of a person .”97 
Second, allowing for nationally valid wiretapping order (“roving”):  
“so that one wiretap approval can be obtained for all jurisdictions working 
on an investigation, particularly given the mobility of individuals and the 
capacity of individuals who are mobile to communicate.”98 
Third, making sure that terrorism offenses received the same amount of 
attention and priority as other serious crimes in terms of statute of 
limitations and penalty.  
 
“For example, we are identifying instances where the law 
currently makes it easier to prosecute drug trafficking and 
organized crime or espionage than it is to prosecute 
terrorism…A person who harbors a person involved in 
espionage is subject to stiffer penalties than a person who 
harbors an individual involved in terrorism. We think this 
reflects an inadequate response to the kind of threat that 
terrorism poses to our culture.” 99 
96 Attorney General John Ashcroft Remarks, Press Briefing with FBI Director Robert 
Mueller, FBI headquarters, September 17, 2001. 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/doj_brief002.htm
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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Finally, the proposed legislation make: “providing material support or 
resources to a terrorist organization an offense that would enable us to 
prosecute someone under the money laundering statutes.”100 
On September 19, 2001 congressional members, White House and justice 
department leadership gathered formally to exchange proposals and 
informally to negotiate for compromise. AG John Ashcroft distributed the 
proposed MATA to members of Congress after Monday's press 
conference.101 The AG further “demanded” the MATA to be passed within 
the week, i.e. two days,102 with a dire warning issued on September 24, 
2001 at a Congressional hearing:  
 
"Everyday that passes with outdated statutes and the old rules 
of engagement, each day that so passes is a day that terrorists 
have a competitive advantage. Until Congress makes these 
changes we are fighting an unnecessary uphill battle." 103 
While the MATA was not well received on the Hill,104 the Congress 
nevertheless promised expedited action.  House Judiciary Committee 
 
100 http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/federal/0917/AGFBI.html
101 “DOJ's Anti-Terrorism Law Would Dismantle Civil Liberties, Legislate to Improve 
Security Not Eliminate Freedoms,” Electronic Frontier Foundation Media Release, 
September 19, 2001. http://peacenowar.net/Sep%2019%2001--EFF.htm
102 http://www.patriotresource.com/wtc/federal/0917/AGFBI.html
103 Such strong language, while reflecting a sense of frustration and urgency in the face 
crisis, is most unhelpful in promoting cooperation and facilitating coordinating action.  
“ASHCROFT ASKS CONGRESS FOR ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES,” PBS 
September 24, 2001, 5:45pm EST 
104 Brandon Spun, “Attorney General John Ashcroft Fails to Justify Encroachment of 
Civil Liberties,” Insight Magazine, 9/25/01 (In spite of the AG plead for expedited action 
on MATA - “The American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting 
the necessary defenses to future terrorism attacks” – the law makers were more reticent, 
preferring a more wait and see approach.   The immigrant provisions in Part II were 
found to be most objectionable. “Reps. Steve Chabot (R-Ohio), John Conyers (D-Mich.) 
and Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) shared their concern that such stipulations may allow for the 
indefinite and discriminatory detainment of aliens…Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) was 
unwilling to give an attorney general “carte blanche” in deciding whether an already 
detained alien posed a threat to national security and how long the detainment of such an 
individual, if determined dangerous, could last”. While Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) was 
concerned “inappropriate release of information”, Judiciary Committee members Reps. 
Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) and Bob Barr (R-Ga.) wanted more time to study the 
document.) 
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Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R-Wis.) issued a statement 
immediately upon receipt of the MATA:  
 
“intend to have the House Judiciary Committee hold a 
legislative hearing followed by a full committee markup as 
soon as possible once legislation is introduced. This fair and 
deliberate schedule will allow for a full debate as well as 
expedited consideration by the full House.”105 
In the face of MATA, EFF Executive Director Shari Steele raised the 
recurring concern with emergency legislations and framed the ensuring 
debate to follow as one of liberty vs. security: "While it is obviously of vital 
national importance to respond effectively to terrorism, this bill recalls the 
McCarthy era in the power it would give the government to scrutinize the 
private lives of American citizens." 
 
The EFF immediate issued a public statement, the first of many salvos, 
against the MATA:  
 
“One particularly egregious section of the DOJ's analysis of its 
proposed legislation says that "United States prosecutors may 
use against American citizens information collected by a 
foreign government even if the collection would have violated 
the Fourth Amendment." 106 
EFF Senior Staff Attorney Lee Tien followed with the observation that 
lesser liberty might not give us more security: "Operating from abroad, 
foreign governments will do the dirty work of spying on the communications 
of Americans worldwide. US protections against unreasonable search and 
seizure won't matter." 107 
105 Sensenbrenner Statement on Bush Administration’s Anti-terrorism “Working Draft” 
Legislation,” U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman. September 19, 2001. 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news091901.htm
106 Id. 
107 “DOJ's Anti-Terrorism Law Would Dismantle Civil Liberties,” Electronic Frontier 
Foundation http://www.eff.org/ For Immediate Release: September 19, 2001 
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The EFF further called upon its member to protest against he impending 
anti-terrorism laws, starting with a nation wide write in campaign. 108 
Originally, AG Ashcroft with the assistance of Rep. James Sensenbrenner 
(R-WI), Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was counting on a 
speedy passage of this legislation. Rep. Sensenbrenner planned to hold 
hearings on Monday (9/24), conduct a mark up session on Tuesday (9/25), 
and then take the bill to the House floor for final passage before the House 
breaks for the Yom Kippur holiday on Thursday (9/27). However, at the 
Committee hearing on Monday afternoon all Committee Democrats and a 
few Republicans expressed grave opposition to this schedule. By the end of 
the hearing Rep. Sensenbrenner agreed to postpone mark up for another 
week, i.e. into October. 
 
Meanwhile, Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, has already indicated that it might take his Committee weeks to 
pass a bill. The senate Judicial Committee was scheduled to hold a hearing 
on Tuesday, September 25, 2001.   
 
Once tabled, ATA was widely attacked from liberal and conservatives alike.  
President George Bush has to come to its defense. On September 25, 2001, 
he advocated for the ATA in a policy speech at FBI:  
 
“I hope Congress will listen to the wisdom of the proposals that 
the Attorney General brought up, to give the tools necessary to 
our agents in the field to find those who may think they want to 
disrupt America again. We're asking Congress for the authority 
to hold suspected terrorists who are in the process of being 
deported, until they're deported.  That seems to make sense 
…And we're asking for the authority to share information 
between intelligence operations and law enforcement … the 
proposals we've made on Capitol Hill, carried by the Attorney 
General, has been carefully reviewed. They are measured 
requests, they are responsible requests, they are constitutional 
requests…And in order to win the war, we must make sure that 
 
108 Cyber rights groups urges defeat of 'Anti-Terrorism 
Act'http://groups.yahoo.com/group/portside/message/1413
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the law enforcement men and women have got the tools 
necessary, within the Constitution, to defeat the enemy.” 109 
On September 27, 2001, President Bush issued another statement in support 
at the CIA: 
 
"I intend to continue to work with Congress to make sure that 
our law enforcement officials at home have got the tools 
necessary -- obviously, within the confines of our Constitution -
- to make sure the homeland is secure; to make sure America 
can live as peacefully as possible; to make sure that we run 
down every threat, take serious every incident. And we've got 
to make sure, as well, that those who work for the nation 
overseas have got the best available technologies and the best 
tools and the best funding possible." 
 
On September 29, 2001, President, as consistent with his political 
style, was compelled to by pass the Congress and directly appeal to 
the people in his weekly radio address: 
 
"I'm asking Congress for new law enforcement authority, to 
better track the communications of terrorists, and to detain 
suspected terrorists until the moment they are deported. I will 
also seek more funding and better technology for our country's 
intelligence community." 110transcript.
Meantime, on September 24, 2001, the House Judiciary Committee held a 
“briefing” for civil liberties groups regarding the ATA of 2001. 111 As 
expected, critics of the ATA raised substantial civil rights concerns.112 
Including: 
 
109 “President: FBI Needs Tools to Track Down Terrorists:  Remarks by the President to 
Employees at the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Headquarters,” For Immediate 
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, September 25, 2000 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010925-5.html
110 Radio Address of the President to the Nation, The White House, September 29, 2001. 
111 The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Rep. Sensenbrenner, did not want 
have Attorney General and the ACLU appearing the same day as co-equal. 
112 For a Congressional reaction to the ATA, see Brandon Spun, “Judiciary Committee 
Balks at Proposed Antiterrorism Act,” Insight Magazine (Sept. 25, 2001), at  
http://www.citizenreviewonline.org/sept_2001/judiciary_committee.htm. (last visited 
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James Dempsey as with Morton Halperin113 both objected to proposed 
changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and associated 
electronic surveillance procedures.  The CDT was also displeased with 
defining hacking as terrorism and allowing (authorizing and obligating) IPS 
to monitor clients account.114 
While Greg Nojeim (ACLU) raised electronic surveillance issues,  David 
Cole (Georgetown University Law Center) articulated immigration 
concerns.  For Brad Jansen (Free Congress Foundation), he was concerned 
money laundering and forfeiture issues and Rachel King (ACLU) were 
concerned with criminal law problems.115 
Finally, People For the American Way had called for public hearings on the 
administration's legislation, and urged members of Congress to pass 
legislation only when they adhered to three basic principles: 
 
(1) The provisions should be carefully drafted to preserve  
constitutional liberties and to prevent abuse of power; 
(2) There should be meaningful judicial review and strict congressional 
oversight; 
(3)  Anti-terrorism laws should be narrowly tailored to achieve clearly  
stated goals and objectives. 116 
November 26, 2003) (Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) was unwilling to allow the AG to 
decide whether an alien should be detained indefinitely as national security threat. Rep. 
Barney Frank (D-Mass.) was concerned with allowing the FBI to spy on American, 
risking the “inappropriate release of information”, as with the case Rev. Martin Luther 
King Jr.   Judiciary Committee members Reps. Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) and Bob Barr 
(R-Ga.) did not want to rush the Patriot Act without the proper hearing and deliberation, 
since many of the provisions are very controversial (computer surveillance) and were 
rejected by the committee before.) 
113 Tech Law Journal Daily E-Mail Alert, September 25, 2001, 9:00 AM ET, Alert No. 
272. http://www.techlawjournal.com/alert/2001/09/25.asp
114 Declan McCullagh, “Anti-Terror Bill Not Done Yet,” Wired News 02:00 AM Sep. 29, 
2001 PT  http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47199,00.html
115 See, prepared statement of King.
116 “Bipartisan Anti-Terrorism Bill Abandoned in House, Civil Liberties Protections 
Sacrificed to Administration Pressure,” 
http://www.citizenreviewonline.org/oct_2001/bipartisan_antiterrorism_bill.htm
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The AG’s pushed for early adoption of ATA backfired for a number of 
reasons.  First, the AG has failed to discuss with the White House and 
consulted with key administrative officials before making the ATA public.117 
It was a very much behind the scene affairs by DOJ legal staff, under the 
leadership of Dinh.  For example, Josh Bolten the deputy chief of staff of the 
White House was kept in the dark until the ninth hour.  Likewise, the White 
House legal counsel’s office and legislative affairs office was not advised.  
None of the government departments were advised, informed, notified or 
consulted over the ATA.  They did not even have a copy of the proposal 
before Monday September 17, 2001. 118 
Second, the AG has failed to sought support from key Congressional 
leadership, choosing to adopt an us (administration) vs. them (the world – 
court, Congress, interest groups, dissenters) attitude and take it or leave it 
approach.   In this regard, the Bush administration has decided early on the 
USA PATRIOT ACT legislative process not to seek a negotiated 
compromise but preferred an imposed, all or nothing, solution.  For example, 
the powerful Republic chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Sensenbrenner, 
heard about the ATA package on the morning of September 16, 2001 at 
home while Ashcroft was making the announcement on TV of things to 
come in a talk show.119 House Speaker Dennis Hasket was likewise not 
informed.120 Sensenbrenner was finally given a fax copy of the proposed 
ATA in the evening.121 
The first sign of trouble came when Sensenbrenner informed Ashcroft that 
while he was eager to work with Ashcroft to produce a good legislation with 
bi-partisan support, his cooperation was not to be taken for granted. Still, the 
 
117 The Bill was not vetted by respective agencies through MBO but instead drafted by 
the DOJ lawyers alone; a most unusual process.  AG Ashcroft and his DOJ staff did not 
even trust “loyal” and “constructive” comments of the other executive branch.  
118 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon & 
Shuster, 2003), p. 75. (Source  Bolten, see p. 646). 
119 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 73. (Source  Sensenbrenner, see p. 646). 
120 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 73. (Source  Sensenbrenner, see p. 646).  Hasket was unhappy at not 
being kept informed, much less being consulted, p. 74. 
121 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 74  ( Source  Sensenbrenner, see p. 646).   
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Ashcroft was unyielding and unapologetic.122 To demonstrate his 
seriousness and power, Sensenbrenner insisted upon having the AG removed 
the suspension of habeas provision in the original ATA draft before the ATA 
could move forward.123 
Third, the AG underestimated the political resistant he was to encounter, 
particularly from members of his own party, such as Bob Barr.  He certainly 
did not anticipate ACLU joining cause with Bob Barr in seeking the delay, if 
not derailment, of the ATA. 124 On September 21, 2001 (Friday), Bob Barr 
with four other members of the House Judiciary Committee sent a letter, 
drafted by ACLU, to Sensenbrenner listing their concerns with the ATA as 
proposed. The letter particularly listing ten provisions that required 
significant “further public debate” before adopted. 125 These included: (1) 
wiretapping a cell phone number; (2) allowing for FISA order when “a” 
purpose of investigation was to obtain foreign intelligence; (3) authorizing 
“sneak and peek” search and seizure without notification to the suspect; (4) 
approving search warrant without probable cause; (5) allowing FBI to obtain 
Internet or library records in secret and without judicial oversight; (6) 
detaining non-citizens indefinitely; (7) allowing seizure of terrorists assets 
before hearing. 126 The letter sealed the fate of earlier passage of the ATA as 
planned. By September 25, 2001 ATA was dead on arrival. 127 
The USA ACT 
The democratic response to ATA (later PATRIOT ACT) was the USA 
ACT Senate bill 1510128 introduced on October 4th.129 Originally it was to be 
 
122 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 74  ( Source  Sensenbrenner, see p. 646).   
123 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 74  ( Source  Sensenbrenner, see p. 646). 
124 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 121. 
125 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 121. 
126 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 121-122. 
127 Steven Brill, After: How American Confronted the September 12 Era (N.Y.: Simon 
& Shuster, 2003), p. 122. 
128 .1510 was introduced by Senator Daschle for himself and Senators Lott, Leahy, Hatch, 
Graham, Shelby and Sarbanes. 
129 Senator Leachy, Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee along with the  Democrat 
majority leader, Senator Daschle, and the Republican minority leader, Senator Lott, also 
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tabled for a vote on October 9, 2004.  But in the last minute, after an all-
night negotiation by the Senate leadership the USA bill was withdrawn. A 
brand new “bi-partisan” bill was introduced. The majority leader, Senator 
Thomas Daschle of South Dakota, called for unanimous consent to bring the 
bill to a floor vote without debate or amendment. This was postponed for 
two days to accommodate Senator Feingold’s amendments.130 The Senate 
finally passed the USA ACT on October 11th 2001 131 after a brief (4 hours) 
of debate.132 
The USA ACT was a negotiated anti-terrorism legislation between 
Democratic Chairman Patrick Leahy and Republican Ranking Member 
Orrin Hatch of the Senate Judiciary Committee and with the White House 
and the Department of Justice over a period of two weeks, before it was 
derailed. The negotiation was a difficult, tortuous and meandering one.  The 
difficulties resulted as much from bitter partisanship in Senate as it is from 
an overbearing AG.   
 
Partisanship was everywhere in evident.  Senators voted along party line.  
For example, provisions that have been rejected by prior Republican 
Senators as encroachment on liberty under the Clinton administration was 
now embraced by the same Senators as promoting security of the nation post 
9/11. “In fact, then Sen. Ashcroft voted to table that amendment, and my 
good friend from Utah, Senator Hatch, spoke against it and opined, "I do not 
 
the chairmen of the Banking and Intelligence Committees, Senator Sarbanes, Senator 
Graham of Florida, Senator Hatch, and Senator  Shelby introduced the USA ACT on 
October 4, 2001. 
130 Senate Debate on The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001, Congressional 
Record: October 11, 2001 (Senate), Page S10547-S10630,  
S10570http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s101101.html
131 While the final USA PATRIOT Act is much improvement over the original 
(September 19, 2001 MATA aka ATA) draft, it did not go far enough in protecting 
citizens’ rights.  For example, the original Administration proposal allowed the use of 
foreign law enforcement agencies wiretapped information in U.S. criminal proceedings 
against U.S. citizens; the freezing of non-criminal before trial and conviction;  obtaining 
of educational records without a court order. All of them removed or revised in the final 
bill. “Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy The Uniting And Strengthening of America Act 
Of 2001 ("USA ACT")” (October 9, 2001) 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/100901a.html
132 Senate Debate on The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001, 
Congressional Record: October 11, 2001 (Senate), Page S10547-S10630 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s101101.html
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think we should expand the wiretap laws any further. " I recall Senator 
Hatch’s concern then that "We must ensure that in our response to recent 
terrorist acts, we do not destroy the freedoms that we cherish."133 
An overbearing AG was abundantly demonstrated by an AG who used 9/11 
terrorism threat to make opposing lawmakers followed the Administration 
line, silently and compliantly.  Those who spoke up to the Administration 
were not only considered as disloyal, but viewed as unpatriotic (in 
questioning the USA PATRIOT ACT.)  An overbearing AG was also 
demonstrated by an AG who would not keep to his promise on negotiated 
anti-terrorism terms, and instead faulted the democrats for not acting fast 
enough to approve the Administration’s  frequently changed anti-terrorism 
bill.  As recalled bitterly by Senator Leahy: 
 
“On several key issues that are of particular concern to me, we 
had reached an agreement with the Administration on Sunday, 
September 30. Unfortunately, within two days, the 
Administration announced that it was reneging on the deal. I 
appreciate the complex task of considering the concerns and 
missions of multiple federal agencies, and that sometimes 
agreements must be modified as their implications are 
scrutinized by affected agencies.” 134 
For example, negotiated agreement on allowing for judicial supervision of 
grand jury testimony released to executive branch for intelligence purposes 
was reneged within two days of September 30.135 
The USA ACT incorporate proposed provisions from Senator Leahy's initial 
package of the USA ACT;136 Intelligence Committee provisions sponsored 
by Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham137 and committee 
 
133 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy The Uniting And Strengthening of America Act 
Of 2001 ("USA ACT")” (October 9, 2001). para. 8. 
134 Id. para. 9. 
135 Id. para.  
136 Mainly on securing Northern border, providing for the needs of victims and State and 
local law enforcement, and criminal law improvements. Leahy initial proposals were 
given to the AG on September 19, 2001, the day the AG unveiled his ATA effort.  Id. 
Para. 5. 
137 Senator Graham's Anti-Terrorism Bill: “Intelligence to Prevent Terrorism Act of 
2001,” Sept. 23, 2001. ttp://www.cdt.org/security/010923ipta.pdf 
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member Dianne Feinstein; Banking Committee money laundering 
provisions138 and other provisions proposed by other senators. The primary 
objective of the USA ACT was to seek a more balanced approach to provide 
security for the nation in the backdrop of 9/11 through negotiation, 
compromise and above all else bi-partisan cooperation. As Senator Patrick 
Leahy put it: 
 
This is not the bill that I, or any of the sponsors, would have 
written if compromise were unnecessary. Nor is the bill the 
Administration initially proposed and the Attorney General 
delivered to us on September 19, at a meeting in the Capitol. 
 
We were able to refine and supplement the Administration’s 
original proposal in a number of ways. The Administration 
accepted a number of the practical steps I had originally 
proposed on September 19 to improve our security on the 
Northern Border, assist our federal, state and local law 
enforcement officers and provide compensation to the victims 
of terrorist acts and to the public safety officers who gave their 
lives to protect ours. This USA Act also provides important 
checks on the proposed expansion of government powers that 
were not contained in the Attorney General’s initial proposal. 
 
In negotiations with the Administration, I have done my best to 
strike a reasonable balance between the need to address the 
threat of terrorism, which we all keenly feel at the present time, 
and the need to protect our constitutional freedoms. Despite my 
misgivings, I have consented to some of the Administration’s 
proposals because it is important to preserve national unity in 
 
138 Senator Levine (D-MI), Hearing of Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs on Money Laundering and Terrorism, September 26, 2001. 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=211390  Terrorism was provided in 
Title III to USA PATRIOT ACT. 
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this time of crisis and to move the legislative process forward. 
139 
The USA ACT, as proposed, was an unfinished business; a work in progress 
subject to further Party – Administration negotiation, House Judiciary 
Committee legislative proposals,140 court scrutiny (on Constitutionality), and 
Senate Judicial Committee oversight  hearings (in practice).141 
Substantively, the USA ACT was more comprehensive in scope, define in 
focus, integrative in approach and broad in operations.  For example, in 
terms of scope, the ACT was not contented with giving the federal 
government more power to fighting terrorism but also seek to provide 
compensation for victims and liabilities for terrorism workers.142 In terms of 
focus, the ACT was not contended with paying lip service to protecting civil 
liberties and individual rights but also make clear that “hate crime” against 
Islamic people was not acceptable.143 In terms of integration, the ACT was 
not only relying on the federal government to fight terrorism but invite and 
 
139 “Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy The Uniting And Strengthening of America Act 
Of 2001 ("USA ACT")” (October 9, 2001) 
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200110/100901a.html
140 The House version of the `Uniting and Strengthening America Act' or the `USA Act 
of 2001' was passed on October 12, 2001 (HR 3108).  The House version of USA ACT 
was a compromise between the House PATRIOT ACT (HR2975) and Senate USA ACT 
(S. 1510) (passed on October 11, 2001).  The majority staff who prepared the House USA 
ACT of 2001 was instructed to start with the Senate version of USA ACT and jettison 
provision that were not compatible, e.g. 5 years instead of 2 years sunset clause, since the 
Senate USA ACT itself was already a work of compromise incorporating many of the 
Administration desired provisions, during the last three weeks of negotiation. Some of the 
more significant provisions included: (1) provides  for modernization of pen register and 
trap and trap law, i.e. authority to capture address not content; (2) provides for nation 
wide service of electronic warrant and terrorism warrant; (3) provides for “roving 
wiretap” of target’s phone; (4)  authorizes FISA wiretap after showing that terrorist 
investigation is “a significant” reasons; (5) provides for sharing of “foreign intelligence 
information”, including grand jury testimony, between law enforcement and intelligence 
community,  (6) expands ability to obtain business information with FISA order of 
certified to the court that information is relevant to foreign intelligence investigation; (7) 
provides for 5 years sunset of selected provisions.  See Judiciary Committee Majority 
Staff Description of the House bill, as of Friday morning, Oct. 12, 2001. 
http://www.cdt.org/security/011012patriotinfo.pdf
141 “Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy The Uniting And Strengthening of America Act 
Of 2001 ("USA ACT")” (October 9, 2001). para. 4. 
142 See “VICTIMS” Id. para.15 – 24, esp. 20. 
143 See “HATE CRME”, para. 25 – 26, esp. 36. 
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engage the state and local authority to local law enforcement authorities to 
play a key role.144 In terms of broadness, the ACT was not contended to 
fighting terrorism after the fact but sought to prevent terrorists from coming 
to the U.S. through strengthening the Northern border.145 
The lone dissenter to the USA ACT was Senator Feingold (D-Wisconsin. 
His major concerns were four folds. First, the nation should not rush to 
judgment; haste makes waste. 146 The Senate should take time to do things 
right, even if this means to slow down the process.  Second, as a nation we 
should learn from  history and not made the same mistakes we did when we 
passed the Alien and Sedition Acts and suspended  habeas corpus during the 
Civil War, interned Japanese-Americans during World War II, blacklisted 
communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, and harassed antiwar 
protesters during the Vietnam war.147 Third, the Senate has an important 
Constitutional role to play in providing meaningful scrutiny for the bill.148 
Fourth, the Administration should not be allowed to use the occasion to seek 
unlimited powers.149 Fifth, the nation should fight security without 
destroying civil liberties. 
 
Specifically, Feingold supported the idea of "roving wiretaps" but objected 
to its indiscriminate application to situation to permit eavesdrop when the 
targeted person is not the one using the phone.  He objected to allowing the 
police to have access to any typed or stored or “tangible” information with 
administrative order, except under court supervision. He objected to “sneak 
and peek” which allowed the police to search people’s place without 
notifying the person.  He objected to allow system administrators at 
 
144 See “STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT”, para. 27 – 37. 
145 See “NORTHERN BORDERS” Id. para. 38 to 42, esp. 40 – 42. 
146 Senate Debate on The Uniting and Strengthening America Act of 2001, Congressional 
Record: October 11, 2001 (Senate), Page S10547-S10630,  S10571 (“But I still believe 
we needed a more deliberative process on this bill, and more careful consideration of the 
civil liberties implication of it.”) http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s101101.html
147 Id.
148 Id. (“We took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. In 
these difficult times that oath becomes all the more significant.”) 
149 Id. (“Why does the administration insist on  leaving open the possibility that this 
provision will be abused to entirely eliminate the privacy of students' and library patrons' 
computer communications? Is there a hidden agenda here? “) 
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universities or libraries to monitor private net activities of "computer 
trespasser." 150 
When USA ACT came to a floor vote, Senate Feingold negotiated for three 
amendments, all of them were defeated, though not without some consoling 
support from colleagues. 
 
FROM PATRIOT ACT to USA PATRIOAT ACT 
The current USA PATRIOT ACT found its genesis in the PATRIOT 
ACT, introduced as House bill 2975 on October 2, 2001.151 The PATRIOT 
ACT incorporated most of the administration ATA provisions and expanded 
on them.152 The PATRIOT ACT was the negotiated produce of In the 
Republican Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner of Wisconsin, Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee, and Ranking Democrat from Michigan, John Conyers, 
the ranking Democrat.  “On October 12, 2001, after another all-night 
drafting session, a text was produced that had only minor changes from the 
Senate-passed bill. It was rushed to the floor and passed with only three 
Republican and 75 Democratic votes in opposition. Thus by Friday, October 
12, both houses had passed nearly identical antiterrorism bills.” 
 
House and senate leaders work to resolve the differences between HR2975 
and S1510. The work was interpreted by anthrax attack on the Hill.  Issues 
were unresolved for a week.   
 
150 “A Senator's Lonely Privacy Fight,” Wired News: 06:08 AM Oct. 11, 2001 PT 
http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47490,00.html?tw=wn_story_related
151 Substantively, the PATRIOT ACT (HR 2975) was based on Administrative anti-
terrorism proposals contained in CTA, MATA, ATA. H.R. 2975 - Provide Appropriate 
Tools Required To Intercept  and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act  (Rep. 
Sensenbrenner (R) Wisconsin). Oct. 12, 2001. OBM. (“H.R. 2975 includes the provisions 
proposed by the Administration in three main areas: (1) information gathering and 
sharing; (2) substantive criminal law and criminal procedure; and (3) immigration 
procedures.”) http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/107-1/HR2975-h.html
Procedurally: A version of H.R. 2975 was passed by the House Committee on the 
Judiciary 36 to nothing. The House then passed H.R. 2975 by a vote of 337 to 79.   
152 .R. 2975 was introduced by Representative Sensenbrenner for himself and 
Representatives Conyers, Hyde, Coble, Goodlatte, Jenkins, Jackson-Lee, Cannon, 
Meehan, Graham, Bachus, Wexler, Hostettler, Keller, Issa, Hart, Flake, Schiff, Thomas, 
Goss, Rangel, Berman and Lofgren. S.1510 by Senator Daschle for himself and Senators 
Lott, Leahy, Hatch, Graham, Shelby and Sarbanes. 
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The negotiation and compromise between the House (HR2975) and Senate 
(S1510) fell in the following areas: 
 
Major compromise between House and Senate PATRIOT Bill 
 
Provisions Original House 
version 
Senate version Compromise 
Sunset clause  5 years  None  4 years 
McDades law153 None  Revisions to 
McDade 
None 
Money 
laundering 
provisions 
None None Comprehensive  
Money 
laundering 
provisions 
Information-
sharing 
154provisions155 
Sharing 
information 
subject to prior 
court 
authorization  
Sharing 
information 
without notice to 
court 
Sharing with 
notice to the 
court after 
disclosure. 
Electronic 
surveillance 
note 
None None Ex parte and in 
camera notice 
with the court 
when a lawful  
pen register or 
trap and trace 
order is install on 
ISP. 
 
Certification of 
alien as 
terrorists 
Declaration of 
alien as terrorist 
limited to Deputy 
AG 
Declaration of 
alien as terrorist 
limited to 
Commissioner of 
INS 
Declaration of 
alien as terrorist 
limited to Deputy 
AG. 
Revisit of alien 
terrorists 
certification  
Revisit of alien 
terrorists 
certification 
None Revisit of alien 
terrorists 
certification 
153 The McDade law requires federal prosecutors to comply with state ethics laws. 
154 Sharing of grand jury information. 
155 Between law enforcement and intelligence community. 
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every 6 months. every 6 months 
Electronic 
tacking of 
foreign students  
None None Authorized 36 
millions for 
implementation 
of SEVIS.  
Accountability: 
Inspection  
None  None Established 
Inspector General 
for Civil 
Liberties and 
Civil Rights 
inside the  
Department of 
Justice.  
Accountability: 
Court liability 
None None Provide for 
Federal tort relief 
for improper  
government 
release of wiretap 
information. 
Source: Extracted form House floor debate, USA PATRIOT ACT, October 
23, 2001. Congressional Record: October 23, 2001 (House) Page H7159-
H7207 
 
On October 23rd 1001, the USA PATRIOT ACT was debated in the House 
for one hour. The major objections concerned two major issues: i.e. 
legislative procedure and due process: 
 
First the legislative process was considered highly usual and irregular.  The 
draft bill was reported out the House Judiciary Committee 36-0. But that bill 
was jettisoned in lieu of a new one negotiated by the Congressional 
leadership and behind closed door, without input from the Committee or 
House members. The Congressional members were informed of the change, 
afterward. Each Party was given two copies of the bill shortly before the 
floor debate on October 23, 2001. No amendments were entertained.  The 
debate was held late at night and after working hours.  As a result most 
members were ignorant of the content of the bill when asked to vote on the 
it. Representative Frank (D – Mass.) found the process unacceptable: 
 
There is no reason why we could not have had this open to 
amendment tonight. This bill should not be debated now. Was it 
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really necessary  to debate one of the most profound pieces of 
legislation and its impact  on our society that we have had, was 
it really necessary to debate it at night after all of the Members 
who have been working all day were  told to go home? Why 
could this not have been a full-fledged debate with some 
amendments?156 
Mr. Conyers likewise complained: 
 
The members of the Committee on the Judiciary had a free and 
open debate; and we came to a bill that even though imperfect, 
was unanimously agreed on. That was removed from us, and 
we are now debating at this hour of night, with only two copies 
of the bill that we are being asked to vote on available to 
Members on this side of the aisle. I am hoping on the other side 
of the aisle they at least have two copies…there is something 
wrong with that process….79 Members were not able to go 
along with the bill, is that a legislative body that does not 
debate is being railroaded whether they know it or not, whether 
they want to accede to it or not.157 
Some members also complaint of the lack of due process for citizens and 
likely abuse of power by the government. For example, Representative 
Jackson – Lee (D – Texas) was heard to complained: 
 
Mr. Speaker, I think Americans know very well that character is  
judged not so much on how a man or woman acts in the good 
times, but  how we act in the face of adversity …I do believe 
that in making our country safe against terrorism, that we do 
not necessarily need to do away with due process, and that we 
should not target innocent people unfairly because of their race, 
color, sexual orientation, creed, gender, or religion.158 
Other criticism was more pointed and specific. For example, Mr Scott (D-
VA)159 observed that: 
 
156 USA PATRIOT ACT, House floor debate, Congressional Record: October 23, 2001 
(House) Page H7159-H7207 
157 
158 Id. 7203
159 Congressional Record: October 23, 2001 (House), Page H7159-H7207, 7201. 
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First, the new wiretap power was not limited to intelligence gathering but 
broad enough to be used to investigate common crime and innocent citizens; 
 
Second, there were very little protection against the abusive use of wire tape, 
e.g. no probable caused is required for foreign intelligence search warrant. 
 
Third, pen register and track and trace violate people’s privacy right and 
protection form government search and seizure power; 
 
Fourth. the government was allowed to conduct secret searches,  
so-called sneak and peak without telling the target.160 
Finally, on October 25th the final bill, HR 3162, the "USA PATRIOT ACT" 
was debate in the Senate and passed.161 The floor debate was a tightly 
managed one.  Except for Senator Feingold, only those who were involved 
in the drafting or negotiation process were allowed to participate in the 
debate. “The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The chairman and ranking member 
of the Judiciary Committee have 90 minutes each; the Senator from 
Michigan, Mr. Levin, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Wellstone, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, has 20 
minutes; the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold, has 1 hour; the Senator 
from Florida, Mr. Graham, has 15 minutes; and the Senator from 
Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter, has 15 minutes.” 162 
Senator Leady open the debate with the emphatic observation that the bill 
was a hard earned compromise: “This was not the bill that I, or any of the 
sponsors, would have written if compromise was unnecessary. Nor was it the 
bill the Administration had initially proposed and the Attorney General 
delivered to us on September 19, at a meeting in the Capitol.”163 
160 Op Cit. 7201. 
161 The ACT was passed without a conference with the House, who passed a similar bill a 
day earlier. 
162 USA PATRIOT ACT, Floor Debate, Congressional Record: October 25, 2001 
(Senate), Page S10990-S11060; From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access 
[wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr25oc01-91]. (USA PATRIOT ACT, Floor Debate). 
163 Id. Page S10991. 
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He was also quick to point out that: First, the bill was a much improved 
legislation from the September 19, 2001 Administration proposal (ATA – 
MATA); Second, that both of Senate and Administration has made much 
concession; Third, that important safeguard was in place against government 
abuse of power and protection of rights; Fourth, that the bill, even if passed, 
would be a work in progress, subject to supervision by court and monitoring 
by Senate, revisions and amendments along the way. 
 
As to improvements, the Senator named ten areas that the ACT has 
improved from the Administrative proposal of September 19, 2001:164 
First, improved security on the Northern Border; 
Second, added money laundering provisions; 
Third,  added programs to enhance information sharing and coordination 
with State and local law enforcement, grants to State and local governments 
to respond to bioterrorism, and to increase payments to families of fallen 
firefighters, police officers and other public safety workers; 
Fourth, added humanitarian relief to immigrant victims of the September 11 
terrorist attacks; 
Fifth, added help to the FBI to hire translators; 
Sixth, added more comprehensive victims assistance; 
Seventh, added measures to fight cybercrime; 
Eighth, added measures to fight terrorism against mass transportation 
systems; 
Ninth, added important measures to use technology to make our borders 
more secure; 
Tenth, able to include additional important checks on the proposed 
expansion of government powers contained in the Attorney General's initial 
proposal.165 
As to supervision and oversight. Senator Leahy observed: 
 
“I do believe that some of the provisions contained both in this 
bill and the original USA Act will face difficult tests in the 
courts, and that we in Congress may have to revisit these issues 
at some time in the future when the present crisis has passed, 
the sunset has expired or the courts find an infirmity in these 
 
164 S10091. 
165 Id. (verbatim quotes). 
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provisions. I also intend as Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee to exercise careful oversight of how the Department 
of Justice, the FBI and other executive branch agencies are 
using the newly-expanded powers that this bill will give them. I 
know that other members of the Judiciary Committee—
including Senator Specter, Senator Grassley, and Senator 
Durbin--appreciate the importance of such oversight.166 
It was signed into law by President G.W. Bush on October 26th. 
 
III 
A Failure of Process? 
There is a common perception that the USA PATRIOT ACT registered a 
failure of legislative process, citing a lack of public information, official 
consultation and Congressional scrutiny.  When the USA PATRIOT ACT 
came before the House of Representative on October 23, 2001, 
Representative Scott has this to say: 
 
First of all, I think it is appropriate to comment on the process 
by which the bill is coming to us. This is not the bill that was 
reported and deliberated on in the Committee on the Judiciary. 
It came to us late on the floor. No one has really had an 
opportunity to look at the bill to see what is in it since we have 
been out of our offices. The report has just come to us. It would 
be helpful if we would wait for some period of time so that we 
can at least review what we are voting on, but I guess that is not 
going to stop us, so here we are.167 
An interesting research issues presented itself:  To what extent and in what 
manner did the final USA PATRIOT ACT incorporated public sentiments 
and reflected popular interests, e.g. how was the positions of various interest 
groups or perspectives of affected parties taken into account?  In a broader 
context, what was the role and contribution of various interest groups in 
shaping the content and process of USA PATRIOT ACT, originated as 
ATA?   For example, ACLU working with Bob Bar in the House and in the 
 
166 S 10091 – 2. 
167 “House Debate on USA PATRIOT Act” Congressional Record: October 23, 2001 
(House) Page H7159-H7207. http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/h102301.html
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Senate was able to alter the course and tamper the thrust of the ATA.  Many 
progressive and conservatives non-profit groups have worked to cut back the 
scope and reach of the PATRIOT Act, including:  (1) People for American 
Way Foundation. PFAWF founded was 1981 by Norman Lear, Barbara 
Jordan and others “to counter the growing clout and divisive message of 
right-wing televangelists, including Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jimmy 
Swaggart.” Since then it has worked against the spread and influence of 
Radial Right, e.g. challenged the nomination of Judge Bork to the Supreme 
Court (1987) or worked against preaching of creationism (2001).168 PFAWF 
position on and contribution to USA PATRIOT Act is best captured by 
PFAWF’s letter to Congress: “Letter from Ralph G. Neas to Congress on 
Anti-Terrorism Legislation,” (October 9, 2001):   
 
“In our October 1 letter to all Members of Congress, we urge 
that any amendments and the final legislation reflect the 
following principles: Language should be carefully crafted in 
order to preserve constitutional liberties and to prevent the 
creation of overly broad powers that could lead to abuse.  
Meaningful judicial review and oversight should not be short-
circuited.  Anti-terrorism laws should be narrowly tailored to 
that purpose. In particular, we are mindful of the importance of 
these issues and their scope in final legislation: a narrowly 
tailored definition of terrorism which does not inadvertently 
include domestic acts of civil disobedience or other non-violent 
activity;  clear language exempting the content of Internet 
communications from pen register surveillance; meaningful 
judicial oversight of any new law enforcement powers for 
purposes of surveillance of telephone and Internet 
communications;  meaningful judicial oversight of information 
sharing between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, 
coupled with clear separation and a very high wall between 
wiretapping conducted for foreign intelligence surveillance, and 
that conducted for domestic criminal investigations; and  full 
due process, including access to counsel and habeas 
proceedings, and meaningful limitations on detention prior to 
and after filing of charges against alien suspects. Lastly, the 
 
168 “People for American Way Foundation: A history” 
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oId=4976
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sunset provisions in the House bill would improve the final 
version of this legislation, independent of its content.” 169 
With regard to the USA PATRIOT ACT, the CDT170 sought to bring a 
balanced perspective to the anti-terrorism legislation by testifying before 
Congress, acting as clearing house for drafts and analysis, consulting with 
Congressional staff over various drafts; working with other Internet 
industrial and interest groups. CDT was successful in resisting “technology 
mandate” (Section 216), narrowing “computer trespasser” provision, and 
arguing for a “sunset” clause.  CDT is also monitoring the implementation of 
the USA PATRIOT ACT through its Digital Privacy Working Group and 
Internet Caucus Advisory Committee under the auspices of the CDT 
Congressional Internet Caucus’ reacting with Congressional oversight, court 
litigations,  FOIA requests, public education and liaison with various civil 
liberties groups, if need be. 171 
The only public feedback on the ACT came in the form of letters to 
individual Congressman172 or Editorials in the Newspaper. For example, on 
September 25, 2001 an editorial entitled “EDITORIAL: Why the rush?” in 
the St. Petersburg Times (Florida)173 observed that House Judiciary 
Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wis) was rushing the 
ATA of 2001 through Congress and the Justice Department was suspected of 
 
169 http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=2322
170 The Center for Democracy and Technology. CDT is a 501 (c) (3) non-profit public 
policy organization dedicated to promoting the free and open access to global Internet.  
See “CDT Principles” http://www.cdt.org/mission/principles.shtml The Mission of CDT 
is: “The Center for Democracy and Technology works to promote democratic values and 
constitutional liberties in the digital age … CDT seeks practical solutions to enhance free 
expression and privacy in global communications technologies.” See “CDT Mission” 
http://www.cdt.org/mission/ To this end, the CDT promotes “Free Expression,” protects 
“Information Privacy,” and resists “Electronic Surveillance” in the net. See “CDT 
Activities”.  http://www.cdt.org/mission/activities.shtml
171 See “Network Security and Government Surveillance,” at page 4 of “Summary of 
Activities 2001 and Work Plan 2002,” The Center for Democracy and Technology. 
January 2002. http://www.cdt.org/mission/
172 Sonia Arrison is the director of the Center for Freedom and Technology at the San 
Francisco-based Pacific Research Institute, “ OPINION, “ New anti-terrorism law goes 
too far.” The San Diego Union-Tribune, October 31, 2001, Wednesday, Pg. B-9, 791 
words. (Defending the nation against terrorist acts can and should be done without 
eroding America's liberties.) 
173 EDITORIAL: Why the rush?” St. Petersburg Times (Florida) September 25, 2001, 
Tuesday, 0 South Pinellas Edition, Pg. 10A, 505. 
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using 9/11 to get many of the powers it failed to obtain from Congress in the 
past. Observing: “Congress needs to slow down and get this right.” Another 
editorial - “An improved antiterrorism bill” – a week later (October 3, 2001) 
in the same page 174 observed that Congressional leaders of both parties were 
doing their best in crafting a compromised ATA that would give law 
enforcement more tools to combat terrorism while protecting civil liberties. 
There were many others editorials during the legislative period, e.g. an 
editorial in the The Washington Post : “Stampeded in the House,”175 faulted 
the House Republican leadership in bypassing the legislative process in 
forcing a vote on a major anti-terrorism bill (USA PATRIOT ACT) that was 
anonymously drafted the night before without Judiciary Committee 
approval, in lieu of one that was unanimously approved by the House 
Judiciary Committee.  On the day the USA PATRIOT ACT was passed, 
October 26, 2001, the Denver Post published an editorial; “EDITORIAL 
Proceed with caution,” The Denver Post 176: “We hope that the executive 
branch and Congress will be especially vigilant to make sure that, in the rush 
to defeat  terrorism, they don't turn a free country into a virtual prison.” 
 
Feedback from special interest groups, e.g. ACLU or CDC, came with 
many, blow by blow analysis of anti-terrorism legislations when the 
legislation moved through the Congress. But none of these NGOs were 
invited to submit their comments, officially.  There is no telling if any of 
them received the attention or consideration of the administration, if at all.177 
The pressure to act expeditiously came from the administration as well as 
Congressional members.178 The Attorney General threatened the Congress 
 
174 “EDITORIAL: An improved antiterrorism bill,” St. Petersburg Times 
(Florida), October 03, 2001, Wednesday, Pg. 14A, 650 words. 
175 the  “EDITORIAL: Stampeded in the House,” The Washington Post October 16, 
2001, Tuesday, Final Edition, Pg. A22, 541 words. 
176 “EDITORIAL Proceed with caution,” The Denver Post October 26, 2001 Friday, Pg. 
B-06, 458 words. 
177 For example, “EFF: Analysis of Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) of 2001,” Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (Sep. 27, 2001) (ATA's expands  FISA powers to cover non-
terrorism cases and increase surveillance of U.S. citizens and non-citizens alike.) 
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Terrorism_militias/20010927_eff_ata_analysis.html;
178 The same thing happened with the establishment of the homeland security. Rapp, D. 
“Editorial: The Scare Factor,” CQ Weekly Vol. 60 no. 27 (July 6 2002) p. 1792  
(Observing that the Congress is incapable of orderly legislating except in time of crisis, 
as spurred by external events and driven by “Scare factor.”) http://80-
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with dire circumstances if anti-terrorism measures were not passed, in a 
timely manner (in days not weeks).  Senator Hatch wanted the Senate to act 
quickly: 
 
“We should not let some of the petty aspects of this body stand 
in the way, not passing this type of legislation right now when it 
is really needed, on the day that, for the first time in my 25 
years, a vote was interrupted by a bomb threat and we all had to 
move outside.…It is time to start fixing these laws. We can play 
around with commissions. We can play around with task forces. 
We can do a lot of other things, but I would like to fix it now.” 
179 
IV 
A Preliminary Assessment 
The biggest concern with the USA PATRIOT ACT, from friends and 
foes alike, was that the Administration's original bill (MATA) was not 
developed in response to the events of 9/11.  Many of the measures have 
nothing to do with ratifying pre 9/11 intelligence failure of improving our 
post 9/11 counter-terrorism efforts.  For example, most of the 
Administration's anti-terrorism measures could be equally applied 
domestically for criminal investigation, e.g. use of FSIA warrant to 
investigate organized crime.  The Administration bitterly resisted any 
attempt to restrict and limit the application of anti-terrorism provisions to 
specific situations, preferring instead to ask for broad and sometimes 
unlimited powers.  
 
More damningly, the Administration resisted every reasonable effort to find 
an accommodation between Administration’s perceived security needs and 
the nation’s real civil liberty concerns. The Administration was not in the 
mood of negotiation, many of the important and reasonable proposals were 
rejected, without examination and discussion.  For example, the Congress 
was prepared to provide interim emergency authority for the Administration 
 
vnweb.hwwilsonweb.com.www.remote.uwosh.edu:2048/hww/shared/shared_main.jhtml;
jsessionid=MDAM1BYYF54GPQA3DIMCFFWADUNBIIV0?_requestid=78525
179 Senate floor debate on wiretap and anti-terrorism proposals DEPARTMENTS OF 
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND RELATED 
AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2002--Continued -- (Senate - September 13, 
2001). http://www.cdt.org/security/010913senatewiretap.shtml
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pending more in-depth study of counter-terrorism and Homeland Security 
needs.  This was declined by the Administration, e.g. in case of grand jury 
information sharing judges could be asked to order such disclosure to save 
lives.180 
The ACT consisted of provisions that had long rested in the files of the law-
enforcement and intelligence agencies waiting for the right moment.181 But 
even Attorney General John Ashcroft, who as a senator had expressed great 
skepticism about many of these items, now insisted that Congress act within 
a week.182 
The ACT was not formally submitted by the Administration, since that 
would have required a review process coordinated by the Office of 
Management and Budget--a procedure that would have provided an 
opportunity for all concerned agencies to provide comments.183 
The USA PATRIOT ACT passed the Congress with an overwhelming 
major, i.e. 356-66 in the House and 98-1 in the Senate and in record time 
 
180 Morton H. Halperin, "Less Secure, Less Free," The American Prospect vol. 12 no. 20, 
November 19, 2001 
181 Senator Kye: “legislation dealing with these issues. There have been numerous 
hearings about these issues. They were in effect lying on the table waiting for us to deal 
with them. Unfortunately, it is the case that even though from time to time we have put 
some of these ideas out,  there has always been a reason not to do it, to wait, to defer, to 
hold  off on that, and that we will have a comprehensive look at this or whatever it might 
be.” Congressional Record: September 13, 2001 (Senate), Page S9362-S9387                        
DEPARTMENTS OF COMMERCE, JUSTICE, AND STATE, THE JUDICIARY, AND 
RELATED  AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2002, Amendment No. 1562. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/s091301.html The point Senator Kye tried to make 
in context was that the proposed Amendment No. 1562 contained no new ideas and have 
been extensively studied and debated before. In fact many of the provisions were 
recommended by the “COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: Report of the National Commission on Terrorism.” 
Chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html The Commission was created by law 
(Pursuant to Public Law 277, 105th Congress) and charged by Congress to investigate 
and evaluate “America's laws, policies, and practices for preventing and punishing 
terrorism directed at American citizens.”   
182 Morton H. Halperin, “The Liberties We Defend,” American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 18 
Oct. 22, 2001. http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/halperin-m-2.html
183 Morton H. Halperin, “Less Secure, Less Free , “ American Prospect Vol. 12, No. 20, 
Nov. 19, 2001.  http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/20/halperin-m.html
50
(six weeks – 9/19 to 10/26/2001), with the nation laboring in a war time 
environment and Congress operating with a siege mentality.   
 
As to the process, there were no time for public consultation,184 community 
feedbacks, professional input, and Congressional scrutiny.185 Not only were 
there no consultation, the public has a difficulty in obtaining the necessary 
information to formulate an informed judgment on the issues involved.   
 
The position taken up by Feingold best summed the concerns raised by 
issues presented by the whole USA PATRIOT ACT process from beginning 
to end. Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee 
of the Judiciary Committee, was consistent in expressing his reservations 
about the USA PATRIOT Act (H.R. 3162), in content and process, in his 
statement on the Senate Floor on October 25, 2001 in casting his lone 
dissenting vote.   
 
The Senator called upon the National, Congress and public to “continue to 
respect our Constitution and protect our civil liberties in the wake of the 
 
184 It is extremely difficult for UUA and other organization to obtain information on the 
Patriot Act, then being considered behind closed door.  UUA Washington Office. 
http://www.witnessforcivilliberties.org/doc/education/factsheetspatriotact.pdf
See also “USA PATRIOT ACT: A Summary of ALA activities,” ALA Washington 
Office, January 19, 2002. (The ALA has to be kept informed about the progress and 
language of the Patriot Act through informal channels, e.g. via Congressional staffers.) 
http://www.ala.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Our_Association/Offices/ALA_Washington
/Issues2/Civil_Liberties,_Intellectual_Freedom,_Privacy/The_USA_Patriot_Act_and_Lib
raries/background.pdf
185 For a contrary observation, see Orrin G. Hatch, Square Peg: Confessions of a Citizen 
Senator (Basic Books, 2002) (There were much debate and discussion behind close door 
by Congressional leadership and staff alike. See pp. 80-90). The Patriot Act did have 
hearings and discussion in the House, but the House anti-terrorism bill was ignored for 
the Senate version, by fiat.  Similarly, there were time set aside for presentation of views 
of individual Senators on the Patriot Act in the Senate on October 25, 2001 (The 
chairman and ranking member of the Judiciary Committee have 90 minutes each; the 
Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Minnesota, Mr. 
Wellstone, has 10 minutes; the Senator from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes, has 20 minutes; 
the Senator from Wisconsin, Mr. Feingold, has 1 hour; the Senator from Florida, Mr. 
Graham, has 15 minutes; and the Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Specter, has 15 
minutes) but the Patriot Act was destined to pass on October 25, 2001, notwithstanding 
objections. See Congressional Record: October 25, 2001 (Senate), Page S10990-S11060. 
http://www.cdt.org/security/011025senate.txt
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attacks” and cautioned against “the mistreatment of Arab Americans, 
Muslim Americans, South Asians, or others in this country.”186 
Senate Feingold reminded the Nation that “wartime has sometimes brought 
us the greatest tests of our Bill of Rights”, giving such examples as the 
passage of “Alien and Sedition Acts [of 1798], the suspension of habeas 
corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans, 
German-Americans, and Italian-Americans during World War II, the 
blacklisting of supposed communist sympathizers during the McCarthy era, 
and the surveillance and harassment of antiwar protesters, including Dr. 
Martin Luther King Jr., during the Vietnam War.” 
 
The Senator objected to the USA PATRIOT Act on philosophical, 
procedural and substantive grounds: 
 
Philosophically, Feingold was against trading liberties for security:  
 
“Of course, there is no doubt that if we lived in a police state, it 
would be easier to catch terrorists. If we lived in a country that 
allowed the police to search your home at any time for any 
reason; if we lived in a country that allowed the government to 
open your mail, eavesdrop on your phone conversations, or 
intercept your email communications; if we lived in a country 
that allowed the government to hold people in jail indefinitely 
based on what they write or think, or based on mere suspicion 
that they are up to no good, then the government would no 
doubt discover and arrest more terrorists. But that probably 
would not be a country in which we would want to live. And 
that would not be a country for which we could, in good 
conscience, ask our young people to fight and die. In short, that 
would not be America.  Preserving our freedom is one of the 
main reasons that we are now engaged in this new war on 
terrorism. We will lose that war without firing a shot if we 
sacrifice the liberties of the American people.”187 
186 “Statement Of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold On The Anti-Terrorism Bill From The 
Senate Floor,” October 25, 2001 
187 Id.
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Procedurally, he was against to rushing the USA PATRIOT Act through 
Congress:  
 
“ You may remember that the Attorney General …provided the 
text of the bill the following Wednesday, and urged Congress to 
enact it by the end of the week….the pressure to move on this 
bill quickly, without deliberation and debate, has been 
relentless ever since…It is one thing to shortcut the legislative 
process in order to get federal financial aid to the cities hit by 
terrorism…It is quite another to press for the enactment of 
sweeping new powers for law enforcement that directly affect 
the civil liberties of the American people without due 
deliberation by the peoples' elected representatives.” 188 
The AG was quick to rebut the charge and defend the process: 
 
Well, frankly, I don't know that I—it might be better to allow 
different Members to ask specific questions. I do want to 
recognize the fact that over the course of the last maybe 10 
days, I've been working with individuals from the Minority 
Leader of the House to the Committee Chairman in the Senate. 
We've had lots of time together. The Ranking Member and I 
have spent time together. The Chairman and I have spent time 
together. We've invited the leadership of Committees of both 
Houses to confer with us about this measure, and we—we 
believe that this is a measure that should—that is the result of 
collaborative effort and work, and so there is reason for us to 
have substantial agreements.189 
Substantively, Feingold was of opinion that the USA PATRIOT ACT 
(“bill”)  failed to “strike the right balance between empowering law 
enforcement and protecting civil liberties.”  
 
Particularly, he has the following objections:190 
188 Id.
189 http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju75288.000/hju75288_0.HTM
190 Feingold was supportive of many provisions in the Bill, including: FBI should be able 
to seize voice mail messages as well as tap a phone; Federal criminal law on the 
possession and use of biological weapons should be re-written; Cables communication 
should be treated the same as phone lines communication; Penalties of terrorist crimes 
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(1) The bill gives the law enforcement agencies new and expansive powers 
to investigate not only terrorism but other crimes, e.g. the “sneak and peak” 
warrant.  Government can now avoid the stricture and protection of the 
Fourth Amendment by claiming "reasonable cause to believe" that providing 
notice to searched suspects “may" "seriously jeopardize an investigation." 
 
(3) The bill allows law enforcement to monitor a computer with the 
permission of its owner or operator, but without warrant or probable cause, 
e.g. unauthorized use of company or library computers by employees or 
patrons. 
 
(4) The bill allows the use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 
investigative powers, without meeting the rigorous probable cause standard 
under the Fourth Amendment, if the government can show that intelligence 
is a "significant purpose" of the investigation, even if criminal investigation 
is the primary purpose. 
 
(4) The bill allows the use of FISA to compel the production of records from 
any business regarding any person, if that information is sought in 
connection with an investigation of terrorism or espionage. This allows the 
he government to go on a fishing expedition. 
 
(5) The original ATA allows the Attorney General extraordinary powers to 
detain immigrants indefinitely, including legal permanent residents on “mere 
suspicion” that the person is engaged in terrorism.  The bill requires the 
Attorney General to charge the immigrant within seven days. It further 
required Attorney General or its deputy to review the detention decision 
every six months.  Suspected or non-deportable aliens might still be detained 
without trial or based on mere suspicion for an indefinite period of time.  
 
(6) The bill allows the detention and deportation of people engaging in 
innocent associational activity, i.e. guilt by association.  For example 
innocent people can be arrested, detained and deported for providing lawful 
assistance to groups that are not even designated by the Secretary of State as 
terrorist organizations, but instead have engaged in vaguely defined 
"terrorist activity" sometime in the past. To avoid deportation, the immigrant 
 
should be increased; statues of limitations for terrorist offenses should be extended or 
eliminated.   
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is required to prove a negative, i.e. that he or she did not know, and should 
not have known, that the assistance would further terrorist activity.  
 
(7) The broad definition of terrorism might include Operation Rescue, 
Greenpeace, and even the Northern Alliance fighting the Taliban in northern 
Afghanistan. 
 
Feingold was also not pleased to the intense pressure asserted and high 
handed tactics employed first by the Administration and later by his own 
party to speed up the legislative process and otherwise forced him to consent 
to the Act. In Feingold’s own word: 
 
“When the original Ashcroft anti-terrorism bill came in, they 
wanted us to pass it two days later. I thought this thing was 
going to be greatly improved. They did get rid of a couple of 
provisions, like looking into educational records. But there 
were still twelve or thirteen very disturbing things, and I 
thought, OK, we'll take care of this. But then something 
happened in the Senate, and I think the Democratic leadership 
was complicit in this. Suddenly, the bottom fell out. I was told 
that a unanimous consent agreement was being offered with no 
amendments and no debate. They asked me to give unanimous 
consent. I refused. The Majority Leader came to the floor and 
spoke very sternly to me, in front of his staff and my staff, 
saying, you can't do this, the whole thing will fall apart. I said, 
what do you mean it'll fall apart, they want to pass this, too. I 
said, I refuse to consent. He was on the belligerent side for Tom 
Daschle. And everybody said they were surprised at his 
remarks. Reporters thought it was so unlike him. And it is 
unlike him. 
 
One of the interesting stories in this-and this is one that a lot of 
progressives don't want to hear, but it's the truth-is that John 
Ashcroft gave me a call and said, what are your concerns? And 
I told him my concerns about the computer stuff and sneak and 
peek searches. He said, you know, I think you might be right. 
The White House overruled him, which is a fundamental point 
here. Anyone who wants to focus their fire on Ashcroft is 
missing the point. This is the Bush Administration. Ashcroft is 
its instrument. What happened in the Senate was that even 
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though the Attorney General was going to allow these changes 
to make it moderately better, the Administration insisted, and 
Daschle went along with pushing this through. I finally got to 
offer the amendments late at night, and I got up there and I 
made my arguments. And a lot of Senators came around to me, 
who, of course, voted for the bill, and said, you know, I think 
you're right. Then Daschle comes out and says, I want you to 
vote against this amendment and all the other Feingold 
amendments; don't even consider the merits. This was one of 
the most fundamental pieces of legislation relating to the Bill of 
Rights in the history of our country! It was a low point for me 
in terms of being a Democrat and somebody who believes in 
civil liberties.” 191 
 
V
Conclusion  
This article is part of a larger research project about the “making” of the 
USA PATRIOT ACT: when, what, how and why the ACT came into 
existence.  This article – “Legislative Process and Dynamics” -  is mainly 
concerned with questions of when, what and how, leaving the issues of why 
to a later article.192 In the process, we discovered that the legislative process 
was hurried and flawed.  The ACT was passed with little Congressional 
scrutiny and still less public input.  For example, the ACT became law 
without the citizens being fully aware193 of its nature, purpose and impact.194 
This caused grave consequences with our political system 
 
191 Matthew Rothschild, “Russ Feingold interview,” The Progressive magazine, May 
2002. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Politicians/Russ_Feingold.html
192 See Author, “The Making of USA PATRIOT ACT: “Legislative Climate and Political 
Forces.” (On file with author). 
193 The USA PATRIOT ACT was not widely known, before, and in some quarters, long 
after it became law.  The National news agencies and wire syndicate that inform citizens, 
define issues, provide perspective and establish frame of reference, did not see fit to 
report upon the ACT.  See “Analysis of the Nightly News Glossing Over Anti-Terrorism 
Act” 8th Day Center for justice http://www.8thdaycenter.org/092801.html (Both ABC 
and NBC did not give the USA PATRIOT ACT the coverage it was due.  Only ABC has 
a short segment on 9/25/01 warning that that proposed anti-terrorism law: “"give the 
government more power to spy on Americans here at home, monitor internet use with 
little oversight from a judge, lock up immigrants whom the government says might be a 
threat to national security without presenting evidence.") 
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First to observe is that the ACT raised grave concerns and caused much 
alarm with the general public and affected groups.195 For example, 
notwithstanding the fact that Section 215 of the Patriot Act has rarely been 
invoked, library patrons feared that their reading habits were constantly 
being monitored.196 More tellingly, Senator Feinstein reported that her 
office has received 21,434 anti-Patriot Act letters, but less than half cited 
USA PATRIOT ACT provisions as a basis of complaint.197 The citizens 
knew something was wrong with the government’s draconian anti-terrorism 
measures by was not able to articulate the sources of problems. 
 
The commentators198 and librarians199 likewise were at a loss as to the reach, 
scope and applicability of the ACT. This caused much anxiety and 
 
194 The public have a lot of misunderstanding about the USA PATRIOT ACT. “Don't 
fault the misunderstood Patriot Act,” “Letter to Editor” Detroit Free Press, July 26, 2003 
(Jeffrey G. Collins, U.S. Attorney Eastern District of Michigan, pointed out that the 
public oftentimes misconstrued the ACT.  For example, they wrongly assumed that the 
investigative (surveillance) powers given to the government is a sharp departure from the 
past. Or, they erroneously blamed the ACT for allowing the “holding prisoners as "enemy 
combatants.") http://www.freep.com/voices/letters/ecoll26_20030726.htm
195 Judging by public surveys, the public was hardly concerned much less alarmed with 
any loss of civil liberties, when the Act was passed.  Majority of the citizen, until very 
recently, think that it is right and proper to allow the government to have more power to 
fight terrorism at the expensive of civil liberties.  But “ignorance” and 
“misunderstanding” do breed concerns and alarms, especially when the fear of terrorism 
subside after 9/11. 
196 Nat Hentoff, “Big John wants your reading list,” The Village Voice. Mar 5, 2002. Vol. 
47 (9); p. 27 (1 page) (The public is not informed and aware of the extent of government 
powers.)   
197 Susan Schmidt, “Patriot Act Misunderstood, Senators Say Complaints About Civil 
Liberties Go Beyond Legislation's Reach, Some Insist,” Washington Post Wednesday, 
October 22, 2003; Page A04. (At a Senate Judiciary Cmte. oversight hearing (Oct. 21, 
2003) Senators expressed concerns that the public has been misinformed about scope and 
reach, implementation and utility of the Act.). Watch, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT) chairs a 
Senate Judiciary Cmte. hearing on the adequacy of federal laws for responding to and 
preventing acts of terrorism at C-Span on Tuesday, Oct. 21, 2003) 
198 One commentator defended Section 215 by noting: “The "secret court" is the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, which has existed for a quarter-century. To even get 
within the ambit of the court, probable cause must be demonstrated that the surveillance 
involves an agent of a foreign government or power.” Bob Rob, “Shrill critics stealing 
Patriot Act debate,” (September 21, 2003). 
(http://www.azcentral.com/news/opinions/columns/articles/0921robb21.html In fact, the 
USA PATRIOT ACT amended the FSIA “probable cause” requirement.  Under the ACT, 
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constellation.200 For example, librarians were puzzled as to whether they 
were allowed to consult lawyers before complying with a Section 215 
order,201 or how best to reconcile librarians’ professional-ethical 
responsibilities to protect privacy and their legal duties to release client 
information under the ACT.202 More tellingly, a national survey conducted 
in December 2001 – January 2002 showed that librarians’ awareness and 
understanding of the USA PATRIOT ACT to be extremely low.  Barely 
50% (57.7%) have “read or heard” about the ACT immediately after it was 
passed.  Correct understanding of different issues about the ACT ranged 
from a low of 20.8%(allow executive of warrant to be delayed for 
consultation of lawyer) to a high of  47.6% (allow access to record without 
warrant).203 
a Section 215 order can be now be obtained by a certification to the court of relevancy of 
information needed to an on going terrorist investigation, without the need of 
demonstrating “probable cause” showing that the surveillance involves an agent of a 
foreign government or power.   
199 Estabrook, Leigh S. "Public Libraries' Response to the Events of September 11th, A 
National Survey Conducted by the Library Research Center at the University of Illinois 
Graduate School of Library and Information Science." January 22, 2003. Library 
Research Center, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of 
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. January 22, 2003 
http://www.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/national.pdf
200 Rene Sanchez, “Librarians Make Some Noise Over Patriot Act Concerns About 
Privacy Prompt Some to Warn Patrons, Destroy Records of Book and Computer Use,”  
Washington Post Thursday, April 10, 2003; Page A20  
201 Is calling the lawyer for help, not a prohibited disclosure under the USA PATRIOT 
ACT?  
202 48 states have protective library confidentiality and privacy law.  The provisions of 
the law usually run counter to Section 215 of the Patriot Act.  For example, Calif. Gov't. 
Code §6254 and §6267 (2001). The library may not disclose these records except to a) 
staff within the scope of administrative duties, b) with written consent from the patron, or 
c) by order of the appropriate superior court. 
203 Estabrook, Leigh S. "Public Libraries' Response to the Events of September 11th, A 
National Survey Conducted by the Library Research Center at the University of Illinois 
Graduate School of Library and Information Science." January 22, 2003. Library 
Research Center, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of 
Illinois at Urbana Champaign. January 22, 2003 
http://www.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/national.pdf
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The pubic were further confused and aggrieved when the government, in 
order to “mollify” the public,204 mischaracterized the intent and purpose,205 
reach and scope,206 and impact and effect of the ACT.   
 
For example, U.S. Attorney for Alaska testified before a state Senate 
Committee: “[T]here is concern that under the PATRIOT Act, federal agents 
are now able to review library records and books checked out by U.S. 
Citizens… If you read the Act, that’s absolutely not true… It can’t be for 
U.S. citizens.”  In fact, Section 215 of the USA Patriot makes clear that 
“U.S. persons” – a term referring to citizens and some non-citizens alike -- 
can have their record seized by the FBI with a FISA order. 
 
Mark Corallo, Justice Department Spokesperson, spoke to the Bangor (ME) 
Daily News: “ For the FBI to check on a citizen’s reading habits….it must 
convince a judge “there is probable cause that the person you are seeking the 
information for is a terrorist or a foreign spy.”   In fact, Section 215 of the 
 
204 “Interested Persons Memo on Congressional oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
Department of Justice anti-terrorism policies – DOJ’s dismissive response on civil 
liberties,” ACLU Memo, dated June 4, 2003. (“DOJ has been deceptive in describing the 
scope of the powers it has been granted, apparently to mollify widespread public 
concern”) http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12812&c=206
205 “RIGHTS AND THE NEW REALITY; Telemarketer Terrorists?”  Los Angeles 
Times California Metro; September 13, 2003.  Part 2; Page 10 (476 words) (The USA 
PATRIOT ACT was being used to investigate common criminals, e.g. telemarketers 
accused of swindling elderly consumers, a lawyer accused of stashing stolen funds in a 
Belize bank account and various drug dealers. This is contrary ultimate purpose of th 
ACT original intent of the legislators, and avowed promise of the Department of Justice.)  
206 Maine Civil Liberty Union Executive Director, Louise G. Roback, wrote a letter on 
April 16, 2003 to Senator Olympia Snowe complaining of FBI spokesperson’s untruthful 
characterization of the USA PATRIOT ACT when responding to a Bangor Daily News 
article:  “Calais library fights Patriot Act” (April 1, 2003) about Calais Free Library’s 
opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act. Deputy Director Corallo’s misrepresentation was 
reported in “Official counters Patriot Act critics.” On April 9, the Bangor Daily News 
printed an editorial critiquing Justice Department misstatements. See “MCLU Demands 
Truth From Justice Department,” MCLU (“We are concerned that Deputy Director 
Corallo provided false information concerning the powers of the Justice Department 
under the USA PATRIOT Act to the public.”) 
http://www.mclu.org/calais_letter_041603.htm See  also Net Hentoff, “Op-ed: The state 
of our liberties,” Washington Post Aug. 25, 2003. (The government put a spin of USA 
PATRIOT ACT.) http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20030824-110950-4866r.htm
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USA Patriot Act allows the government to obtain materials like library 
records without probable cause.207 
The government’s failure to provide for timely, responsive and accurate 
information over its enforcement policy (e.g., under what circumstances 
would Section 215 powers be invoked?208 ) and practices (e.g., how often 
has Section 215 powers been invoked?209) generated wide spread anxiety 
and generated fear,210 leading to personal resentment, individual protests and 
collective movements across the United States.211 As a keen supporter of 
 
207 See “Reports: Government Missteps After Sept. 11,” Summer 2003.ACLU of 
Northern California. http://www.aclunc.org/aclunews/news0309/reports.html Both the 
government and ACLU have accused each other of misleading the public. For ACLU’s 
allegations, see Seeking Truth From Justice: PATRIOT Propaganda - The Justice 
Department's Campaign to Mislead The Public About the USA PATRIOT Act (ACLU, 
July 2003) (“The Justice Department’s repeated assertion that the USA PATRIOT Act’s 
surveillance provisions cannot be used against U.S. citizens. In fact, the surveillance 
provisions are applicable to citizens and non-citizens alike.”) 
http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=13098 The DOJ’s answer to “Seeking Truth 
From Justice” is the DOJ’s “Dispelling the Myths” on Life and Liberty web.  (“Myth: 
The ACLU claims that the Patriot Act “expands terrorism laws to include ‘domestic 
terrorism’ which could subject political organizations to surveillance, wiretapping, 
harassment, and criminal action for political advocacy.”…Reality: The Patriot Act limits 
domestic terrorism to conduct that breaks criminal laws, endangering human life. 
“Peaceful groups that dissent from government policy” without breaking laws cannot be 
targeted.” (Emphasis in the original) http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/subs/u_myths.htm
208 Eric Lichtblau, “Patriot Act's reach has gone beyond terrorism,” Seattle Times 
September 28, 2003 (Government is using the USA PATRIOT ACT to investigate all 
kinds of crimes: suspected drug traffickers, white-collar criminals, blackmailers, child 
pornographers, money launderers, spies and corrupt foreign leaders.) 
209 The DOJ chose to answer only 28 of the 50 questions posed by the House Judiciary 
Committee by letter of July 13, 2002. See letters to Congress on implementation of the 
USA PATRIOT Act, dated July 26, August 26, and September 20, 2002. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/10/doj101702.html
210 Eric Lichtblau (NYT), “Demand for library records? Zero,” Deseret Morning News 
(Salt Lake City) Pg. A02, September 19, 2003, Friday (872 words) (Emily Sheketoff, 
executive director of the Washington office of the American Library Association 
observed: "If the Justice Department had been more forthcoming with the public … this 
high level of suspicion wouldn't have developed. But they've been fighting for two years 
not to tell people what they were doing, and that left a lot of people wondering what they 
had to hide."  
211 Emily Sheketoff, executive director of the Washington office of the American Library 
Association aptly observed: "If the Justice Department had been more forthcoming with 
the public, this high level of suspicion wouldn't have developed. But they've been 
fighting for two years not to tell people what they were doing, and that left a lot of people 
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Bush administration, Representative Bob Barr,  has occasion to observe: 
“The administration has not been at all forthcoming since then in explaining 
in a clear and open way how that act would be used and is being used. The 
lack of being forthcoming about discussing that has bothered me."212 
Finally, the Attorney General Ashcroft’s farcical justification213 and inept 
defense of Act214 infuriated the Act’s die hard opponents and alienated the 
administration’s core supporters.215 For example, Attorney General Ashcroft 
was openly contemptuous of the law makers’ rightful criticism of Bush 
administration’s anti-terrorism initiatives: "To those who scare peace-loving 
people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only 
aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve 
They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to America's 
 
wondering what they had to hide."  Eric Lichtblau, “Patriot Act debate needless, Ashcroft 
says,” New York Times September 18, 2003. 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/nation/2108405
212 Michael Tomasky, “Strange Bedfellows: Conservative civil libertarians join the 
fight,” The American Prospect Vo. 14, no. 8, September 1, 2003. 
http://www.prospect.org/print/V14/8/tomasky-m.html
213 “Civil libertarians criticize FBI rules; They fear the terrorism crisis is being used as a 
cover to erode personal freedoms,” The Associated Press. The Grand Rapids Press May 
31, 2002. p. A.3. (James X. Dempsey, deputy director of the Center for Democracy and 
Technology observed: “They are using the terrorism crisis as a cover for a wide range of 
changes, some of which have nothing to do with terrorism." Dempsey predicted that the 
power will be used for "every other type of investigation the FBI does.") 
214 ”ASHCROFT'S ENDLESS ATTACKS DIMINISH OFFICE,” Dayton Daily News 
(Ohio), August 11, 2003, Monday, CITY EDITION, EDITORIAL; Pg. A6 (540 words) 
(The Attorney General was best remembered for his fear-mongering and vindictive 
antics: “To those who are alarmed, or who question or criticize his approach, Mr. 
Ashcroft has said: "Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and 
diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies and pause to 
America's friends.")  
215 Myriam Marquez, “BLAME GAME: THE 9-11 BUCK SHOULD STOP WITH 
ASHCROFT,” Sentinel Columnist. Orlando Sentinel. Jun 4, 2002. p. A.9 (“To Ashcroft, 
it seems, the answer to fighting terrorism is cracking down on Americans' civil liberties 
and immigrants' basic human rights.”)  More recently, the Attorney General described 
librarian’s concerns with the Patriot Act “breathless reports and baseless hysteria.” See 
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft "The Proven Tactics in the Fight 
against Crime" Washington, D.C., September 15, 2003. See also ERIC LICHTBLAU, 
“Ashcroft Mocks Librarians and Others Who Oppose Parts of Counterterrorism Law,” 
New York Times, September 16, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/16/politics/16LIBR.html
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friends." 216 He was publicly dismissive of librarians’ legitimate concern 
with the erosive impact of Patriot Act on library privacy: “The charges of the 
hysterics are revealed for what they are: castles in the air built on 
misrepresentation, supported by unfounded fear, held aloft by hysteria." 217 
Last not least, Barbara Comstock, a spoke person the Department of Justice, 
was loudly belittling local grassroots communities’ genuine anti-Patriot 
sentiments:  
 
“Some of the different ordinances that have passed throughout 
the country, about 45 percent of them, almost half, are either in 
cities in Vermont, very small populations, or in sort of college 
towns in California. It’s in a lot of the usual enclaves where you 
might see nuclear-free zones or, you know, they probably 
passed resolutions against the war in Iraq.”  
 
The statement drew predictable and angry response from Senator Leahy:  
 
“It is unfortunate that the Justice Department felt it appropriate 
to ridicule these grass-roots efforts to participate in an 
important national dialogue. The opportunity to engage in 
public discourse is one of the essential rights of Americans, and 
I am proud that Vermont towns are among those dedicated to 
thinking about and acting on these important issues. More 
importantly, the concerns expressed in my home state are being 
echoed by Americans in all 50 states. These communities 
represent millions upon millions of Americans, not just a few 
liberty-and-privacy-conscious Vermonters, as the Justice 
Department has insinuated. Impugning Vermonters, dedicated 
librarians and United States Senators for asking questions and 
raising concerns does not advance the debate or instill public 
confidence in the Ashcroft Justice Department’s use of the vast 
powers it wields. In fact, it achieves the opposite.” 218 
216 See Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
December 6, 2001. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2001/1206transcriptsenatejudiciarycommittee.htm
217 Ashcroft later explained to ALA that he was not directing his comments to the 
librarians, but the ACLU. 
218 Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, “Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary Hearing on Protecting Our National Security from Terrorist Attacks: A Review 
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As a result of above observed public confusion and anxiety, government 
zealotry and ineptitude, the USA PATRIOT ACT continues to draw 
vociferous criticism219 and fiery protests, 220 four years after its passage.221 
Many of the issues that should and could have been carefully investigated 
and seriously discussed,222 such as the impact and implications of the USA 
 
of Criminal Terrorism Investigations and Prosecutions.” October 21, 2003. 
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/member_statement.cfm?id=965&wit_id=2629
219 By far the most vocal and prolific commentator is Nat Hentoff, a columnist with the 
Village voice. For his brief Bio. See “Nat Hentoff” Washington Post. (1998) 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/opinions/hentoff.htm For a sample of his 
critique of the Patriot Act, see “Ashcroft Out of Control: Ominous Sequel to USA Patriot 
Act,” Village Voice February 28th, 2003 and “Crossing Swords With General Ashcroft: 
Where Is Our Bill of Rights Defense Committee?” truthout December, 20., 2002 (Citing 
Thomas Jefferson: “The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain 
occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive.” (letter to Abigail Adams, February 22, 
1787), he called for active grassroots resistance to the USA PATRIOT ACT.)  There are 
to be many others across the United States and from the very beginning. See “Opinion: 
The Patriot Act is a threat,” Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), OPINION; Pg. 
A15, August 27, 2003, Wednesday (479 words) (USA PATRIOT ACT was compared 
with "general search warrants" used by British customs agents during American 
Revolution.) 
220 The Attorney General’s 16 states and 18 cities road show to promote the USA 
PATRIOT ACT was met with protesters everywhere the Attorney General went.   Diane 
Urbani, “Patriot Act undercuts King's dream, Utahn says,” Deseret Morning News (Salt 
Lake City, August 29, 2003. Friday (762 words) (The Attorney General was met with 
200 protesters.) [Another account put it at 150. See Angie Welling and Jennifer Dobner, 
“Act called vital tool in war on terror.” Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City), WIRE; 
Pg. A01, August 26, 2003,Tuesday (1008 words)]. 
221 See Leonard Kniffel, “CPL head's comments provoke outrage,” American Libraries.
Jan 2002. Vol. 33, Iss. 1; p. 30 (Librarian should never surrender library information 
except by court order and with judicial process.) “EDITORIAL: Tempest in a teapot,” 
Las Vegas Review - Journal. Jun 3, 2002. p. 6.B (It is necessary to trade liberty for 
security in time of crisis.) 
222 See GREG BLUESTEIN, “University professors: Country must not overreact,” 
redandblack.com (University of Georgia student newspaper) September 12, 2001. 
(Notwithstanding the catastrophic nature and tragic consequences of  9/11 attack, the 
nation should not overact.).  CATO analyst Timothy Lynch echoed many other others 
that we should not react to 9/11 in a knee jerk fashion. Looking back in history, Lynch 
observed that all of the country’s effort to fight terrorism was reactionary in nature and 
laboring under a crisis mentality.  “Government officials typically respond to terrorist 
attacks by proposing and enacting "antiterrorism" legislation.”   The Feb. 26, 1993 
bombing of the World Trade Center gave us the Terrorism prevention and Protection Act 
of 1993. The April 19, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building Bombing 
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PATRIOT ACT on civil liberties, are now only beginning to be seriously 
addressed by the lawmakers,223 critically debated by the public, 224 and 
systematically analyzed by the Courts.225 
The voices of dissents could be heard from interested citizens and concerned 
activists across the Nation, from California to New Work, Wisconsin to 
 
Oklahoma led to the passage of Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of 1995.  
Lynch argued that “The cycle: Terrorist Attack and “Anti-Terrorism Legislation” must be 
stopped.  Particularly, policy makers should refrain from legislation until they have time 
to study and deliberate upon four issues: (1) accountability; (2) history; (3) reality; (4) 
freedom. Timothy Lynch, “Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While 
Fighting Terrorism,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 443, June 26, 2002. 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa443.pdf
223 See “Ron Paul Applauds Congressional Restrictions on Patriot Act,” The Office of 
Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX), July 25, 2003. http://www.antiwar.com/paul/paul72.html
(Reprint)  
224 See Editorial: “Privacy in time of crisis,” Orange County Register. Oct 1, 2001. p. 
Edit; Chuck McGinness, “LIBRARIAN'S POST-ATTACK REPORT TO FBI SPARKS 
PRIVACY DEBATE,” Palm Beach Post, Dec 1, 2001, p. 1.B; Anonymous, “FBI spies 
on suspect at library,” American Libraries. Dec 2001. Vol. 32, Iss. 11; p. 24 (2 pages); 
Pat Schneider, “NEW U.S. LAW AIDS SNOOPING ON READERS; LOCAL 
BOOKSTORES, LIBRARIES WORRY,” Madison Capital Times. Dec 25, 2001. p. 1.A; 
Nat Hentoff, “Big Brother in the library; Patriot Act turns librarians into FBI informants,” 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES. Feb 25, 2002. p. A.21; Nat Hentoff, “Big John wants 
your reading list,” The Village Voice. Mar 5, 2002. Vol. 47, Iss. 9; p. 27 (1 page 
225Carl Carlson, “Patriot Act Provision Challenged in Court,” e-Week July 30, 2003 
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,4149,1208043,00.asp For the text of complaint to the 
first ever legal complaint filed to challenged Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, 
see Muslim Community Ass'n of Ann Arbor, et al. v. Ashcroft No. 03-72913 (E.D. 
Mich. July 30, 2003)., “Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.”  The complaint 
alleged that Section 215 of the Patriot Act unconstitutional in violating First, Fourth, 
Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution (“Preliminary Statement,” para. 1, 2.) 
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/aclu/mcaa2ash73003cmp.pdf
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Florida, on campaign trails226 and in public forums. The dissenters included 
republican and democrats,227 civil libertarians and conservatives.228 
Activists mobilized grassroots movements to establish “Civil Liberties Free 
Zone”229 in open defiance of the Patriot Act.230 The Congress worked with 
afflicted groups and aggrieved citizens to pass law to limit the actual harm 
and contain the potential fallout of the Patriot Act, including denying money 
for enforcement,231 requiring oversight into implementation, 232 and limiting 
 
226 BILL ADAIR, “Graham quiet about his role on Patriot Act: On the campaign trail, he 
isn't bringing up that he co-wrote the controversial bill in the Senate,” St. Petersburg 
Times. June 14, 2003. (Senator Graham did not reveal his role in drafting part of the USA 
PATRIOT ACT as former chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee. Governor 
Dean publicized the fact that he was opposed the Act as unconstitutional: “It can't be 
constitutional to hold an American citizen without access to a lawyer… Secondly, it can't 
be constitutional for the FBI to be able to go through your files at the library or the local 
video store, to see what you've taken out in the last week, without a warrant." 
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/06/14/Worldandnation/Graham_quiet_about_hi.shtml
227 On May 21, 2003, Alaska's Senate unanimously approved the country's second 
statewide anti-Patriot resolution entitled: “HJR 22: PATRIOT ACT AND DEFENDING 
CIVIL LIBERTIES” as a bipartisan effort.  It passed the State Senate unanimously and 
the House 32-1. http://www.akrepublicans.org/coghill/23/spst/cogh_hjr023.php
228 Nicholas Confessore, “In Bed with Bob Barr: How conservatives became the ACLU's 
best friends,” American Prospect. Vol. 12 (19) Nov. 5, 2001 
http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/19/confessore-n.html
229 As of September 18, 2005, 394 Resolutions Upholding Civil Liberties and Rights have 
been passed in communities across the U.S. affecting 61,947,419 people: being 
Community resolutions: 387 and State resolutions: 7. http://www.bordc.org/index.php
230 http://www.bordc.org/states.htm
231 Republican Congressperson Butch Otter from Idaho introduced an amendment to a 
House Appropriations bill (HR 2799) to remove funding from the Department of Justice 
to conduct "sneak and peek" searches. The vote for Otter's amendment was 309-118 with 
widespread bi-partisan support.  See also Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-VT)’s effort in  
offering an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary Appropriations Bill 
of 2004 to cut off Justice Department funding for searches of bookstore and library 
records under Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.   It is co-sponsored by John Conyers, 
Jr. (D-MI) and C.L. "Butch" Otter (R-ID). 
232 On February 25, 2003, Senators Leahy, Grassley and Specter introduced S. 436, the 
"Domestic Surveillance Oversight Act of 2003." http://www.aclu-
or.org/issues/terrorism/FISA_oversightbill.htm On June 11, 2003, Representative Hoeffel 
and others introduced H.R. 2429, the “Surveillance Oversight and Disclosure Act of 
2003. “ The bills amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to improve the 
administration and oversight of foreign intelligence surveillance.” 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/hr2429.html
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the applicability of the Patriot Act.233 For example, on March 6, 2003, House 
Representative Sanders (I-Vermont) introduced the “Freedom to Read 
Protection Act of 2003” (HR 1157) in the House “To amend the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to exempt bookstores and libraries from orders 
requiring the production of any tangible things for certain foreign 
intelligence investigations, and for other purposes.”)  HR1157 was 
cosponsored by 129 bipartisan cosponsors. It was support by 20 newspapers 
editorial boards, 40 library, book, publishing industry, and civil liberty 
groups.  
 
On May 23, 2003, Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA) introduced that “Library and 
Bookseller Protection Act” (S. 1158) in the Senate  “To exempt bookstores 
and libraries from orders requiring the production of tangible things for 
foreign intelligence investigations, and to exempt libraries from 
counterintelligence access to certain records, ensuring that libraries and 
bookstores are subjected to the regular system of court-ordered warrants.”234 
On July 31, 2003 Senator Russell D. Feingold (D-WI) introduced  “The 
Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act” (S. 1507) 
introduced on July 31, 2003 “To protect privacy by limiting the access of the 
Government to library, bookseller, and other personal records for foreign 
intelligence and counterintelligence purposes”235 
July 31, 2003 Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) introduced “Protecting the 
Rights of Individuals Act (S.1552) in the Senate “To amend title 18, United 
States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to 
strengthen protections of civil liberties in the exercise of the foreign 
intelligence surveillance authorities under Federal law, and for other 
purposes.”236 
233 HR 1157 IH. 108th CONGRESS. 1st Session. HR 1157. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/hr1157.html See “The Sanders-Otter-Conyers 
Amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Appropriations Bill of 2004” 
http://listproc.ucdavis.edu/archives/ncal-lib/ncal-lib.log0307/att-0017/01 
talking_points_on_the_Sanders-Otter-Conyers_C_J_S_amndt.doc
234 http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/s1158.html
235 http://www.theorator.com/bills108/s1507.html
236 Specifically the Act provides: "Sec. 4 would....return the standards for the FBI to get 
orders from the FISA Court to the standards that applied pre-USA PATRIOT." "Sec. 4(b) 
would clarify that a library shall not be treated as a wire or electronic communication 
service provider for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 2709, so that a library cannot be required to 
turn over Internet usage records (including e-mail) about its patrons." "Sec. 6(c) would 
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impose a specific limitation on what aspects of electronic communications could be 
captured with a pen/trap order" http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2003_cr/s1552.html
For other legislative effort to scale back the scope and impact of the Patriot Act, see 
“Proposed Legislation” Bill of Rights Defense Committee, 
http://www.bordc.org/legislation.htm (Visited October 12, 2003) 
